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PROPOSITION 215: DE FACTO LEGALIZATION OF POT
AND THE SHORTCOMINGS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Michael Vitiello*
In 1996, California voters passed Proposition 215, officially titled
The Compassionate Use Act of 1996, and popularly known as the
"medical marijuana" initiative. This initiative allows qualifying peo-
ple and their caregivers immunity from criminal prosecution when
the state attempts to charge them with possession or cultivation of
marijuana. Professor Vitiello uses the medical marijuana initiative
as a case study illustrating flaws in California's ballot initiative
proces He examines the history of the initiative process in Califor-
nia, misleading aspects of the campaign for Proposition 215, and
ambiguities in the proposition's language. Concluding that the initia-
tive process as it now stands fosters poor legislation, Professor
Vitiello assesses several reform measures proposed by the non-
partisan Citizens' Commission on Ballot Initiatives and adds his
own proposed reforms to address the problems of misleading adver-
tisements and misleading ballot pamphlets,
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, California gained national prominence when its vot-
ers again resorted to the initiative process to enact controversial
legislation.1 Proposition 215, entitled The Compassionate Use
* Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law; B.A., 1969, Swarthmore College;
J.D., 1974, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I wish to extend special thanks to
Dean Gerald Caplan, whose ongoing support of scholarship at McGeorge has produced
tangible benefits, and to my colleague Professor J. Clark Kelso and former colleague
Professor Adeno Addis for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. I
am extremely grateful to my several research assistants on this project. When
McGeorge students Aura T. Kashin, Stephanie A. Doria and Andrew J. Glendon sug-
gested that we interview Dennis Peron, I did not have the heart to tell them that legal
scholars do not interview real people. Following their suggestion offered rare insight
into the conception of Proposition 215. In addition to their hard work, I was also de-
lighted to work with McGeorge students Jennifer S. Anderson and Catherine L.
Donohue, whose careful research helped bring this project to completion. I also wish
to thank Dennis Peron for allowing us to interview him and to tour his Cannabis Cul-
tivators Club in San Francisco. While this article is critical of some of Peron's actions,
and while not all of his club members may be seriously ill, some of those at the club
were obviously seriously ill, and their gratitude to Peron for his role in providing ac-
cess to marijuana was readily apparent.
1. See Richard Lacayo, Marijuana: Where There's Smoke, There's Fire, TIME,
Oct. 28, 1996, at 36 (referring to California's initiative process as "the tricky practice
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Act of 1996, allows a qualifying person and her caregiver im-
munity from criminal prosecution when the state attempts to
charge such persons with possession or cultivation of mari-
juana.' Beyond this protection, however, the legal effects of
Proposition 215 remain uncertain.
This Article examines the Act from two perspectives. First,
Proposition 215 is yet another example of badly drafted legis-
lation that breeds unnecessary litigation.3 Its drafters used
expansive and intentionally ambiguous language to allow the
widest use of marijuana, and by utilizing the initiative process,
they were not forced to compromise to ensure passage.' Re-
course to the initiative process also allowed Proposition 215's
proponents to gain support through a misleading advertising
campaign. 5
of democracy through referendum" and asserting that Proposition 215, the medical
marijuana initiative, was the most controversial initiative of 1996).
2. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West Supp. 1998) ("Section 11357,
relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the cultivation
of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver, who
possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient
upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.").
3. See J. Clark Kelso, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy, 19 PEPP. L.
REV. 327, 338-44 (1992). Kelso asserts that most initiatives in California are drafted
by private interest groups who are unlikely to consider the array of consequences that
accompany a change in the law. See id. at 339-40. Moreover, the large amount of
money poured into initiative campaigns results in massive media campaigns which
familiarize the public with catchy slogans rather than the proposed substantive
changes in the law. See id. at 341. Kelso also worries that the initiative process im-
properly weakens the power of elected officials, that voters lack the means to make
reasoned decisions about complex issues, and that majoritarian sentiments will en-
danger minority rights. See id. at 343-44.
4. See id. at 339 (asserting that private interest groups who draft initiatives
may not understand how their proposed measure may affect other aspects of state law
and recognizing that drafting errors typically weeded out in a more open forum are
often overlooked in the initiative process).
It is a truism that politicians often misrepresent their positions in campaign litera-
ture and advertisements in order to gain votes. But the consequences of those
misrepresentations are greater when voters are misled during the initiative process.
A politician who has misrepresented her views to the voters cannot frustrate the will
of the people whom she misled unless she can convince a majority of her colleagues
and the executive to vote contrary to the promises she made during the campaign.
Misrepresentations during an initiative campaign, on the other hand, lead directly to
legislation that may not reflect the will of the people. In effect, the voters' mistake in
the initiative process may become the law.
5. Cf Michael Vitiello, 'Three Strikes" and the Romero Case: The Supreme
Court Restores Democracy, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1643, 1684-85 (1997) (discussing how
proponents of California's Proposition 184, the "Three Strikes" initiative, grossly mis-
led the voters with an advertising frenzy promising to keep rapists, murderers, and
child molesters behind bars even though the majority of offenders affected would not
fall within these categories).
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The second perspective examines why proponents of Propo-
sition 215 were forced to use the initiative process. Despite a
brief period during which the federal government allowed lim-
ited use of marijuana for compassionate medical purposes,' the
federal government has demonstrated an uncompromising and
highly political position preventing reasonable accommodation
between anti-drug policy and the limited medical use in those
few areas where marijuana appears to give meaningful relief
to seriously ill patients. The California state legislature has
not had the same history of hostility toward marijuana, how-
ever, repeatedly passing legislation that would allow medical
use of marijuana.8 Yet Governor Wilson has twice vetoed such
legislation, despite broad support for limited use of mari-
juana.'
Thus, despite all of Proposition 215's drafting flaws, and the
questionable motives of its drafters, the initiative process per-
formed as its Progressive originators intended. The challenge
now facing Californians is to reform the initiative process to
avoid its excesses while retaining its virtues.
The first part of this Article reviews briefly the history of
the initiative process and some of the general problems which
have arisen after its enactment. The campaign in support of
Proposition 215 and the language of the measure offer a case
study demonstrating the failings of the initiative process. The
second part of the Article reviews the intransigence of the fed-
eral government and elected officials which sparked the shift
6. See discussion infra Part II.A.
7. See discussion infra Part II.A-B. Most notably, marijuana seems to be an ef-
fective anti-emetic for patients suffering from the severe nausea that can accompany
cancer chemotherapy. One study involving 56 patients who had shown no improvement
with standard anti-emetics, found that 78% of those patients had a positive response to
smoked marijuana with no serious side effects. Since marijuana not only helps control
nausea and vomiting but also stimulates appetite, there is much speculation and anecdo-
tal evidence that the drug would be an effective treatment for the symptoms associated
with AIDS wasting syndrome (including the inability to eat, fatigue, and diarrhea that
result in a starved, gaunt appearance). Although glaucoma is often touted as one of
the main disorders that can be alleviated with marijuana use, current research casts
serious doubt on the drug's actual effectiveness. For example, there is concern that
smoking marijuana may reduce the blood flow to the optic nerve, exacerbating loss of
vision. Additionally, a glaucoma patient must smoke an enormous amount of cannabis
in order to experience the reduction of intraocular pressure.
8. See discussion infra Parts I.B, II.B, III.C.
9. See discussion infra Parts I.B, II.B, III.C; see also Tracie Cone, Reefer Mad-
ness: Law-Abiding Regular Folks Descend Into a Netherworld to Get Relief for
Themselves or Others with Grave Diseases. Why Morphine and Not Marijuana?, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 14, 1995, at 12 (citing a statewide survey showing that
although very few Californians wanted to legalize marijuana, 66% of those surveyed
would support a law allowing medicinal use of marijuana with a doctor's prescription).
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in focus by supporters of medical marijuana use toward re-
course through the initiative process. The third part of this
Article returns to concerns about the poor legislation that of-
ten results from the initiative process, speculating on how the
initiative process might be reformed to maintain the virtue of
direct democracy while avoiding the primary weaknesses often
resulting from the process.0
I. How THE INITIATIVE PROCESS LEADS TO BAD LEGISLATION
A. The Initiative Process
The initiative process was the brainchild of the Progressive
movement in the beginning of the twentieth century" Pro-
gressives believed that the only way to free the state from the
control of big business and the political machine was through
direct democracy. 2 Persuaded to run for governor by the pro-
gressive minded Good Government Group, Hiram Johnson
campaigned against the Southern Pacific Railroad and prom-
ised to end its domination of the California legislature.'
Shortly after his election, Johnson made good on his campaign
promise to get the Southern Pacific Railroad out of politics
when he successfully backed a constitutional amendment cre-
ating the initiative process."
Recent developments have led to legitimate concerns about
the initiative process. In the aftermath of Proposition 13,
which limited the ability of local governments to raise property
taxes, the initiative process has become increasingly popular
with special-interest groups." In addition, the initiative
10. See discussion infra Part III.A-E.
11. See Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desir-
ability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 735-
79 (1988) (discussing the history of the Progressive movement).
12. See DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPO-
SITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1984) (quoting a progressive scholar who wrote, "if
big business was the ultimate enemy of the Progressive, his proximate enemy was the
political machine").
13. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS IN CALIFORNIA, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
IN CALIFORNIA: A LEGACY LOST? 9 (1984).
14. See Sam Stanton, California Voters Lay Down the Law at the Ballot-
Routinely, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 4, 1996, at Al (finding that 168,744 voters ap-
proved the initiative process in the 1911 special election, whereas only 52,093 voted
against it).
15. See Gene Marine, Take the Initiative-Please, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 24, 1996,
at A19 (noting that special interest groups such as large landowners, corporate farm-
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process has become expensive, in part because proponents
must often hire paid signature gatherers to obtain the large
number of signatures required to place the initiative on the
ballot. 6 Paid signature gatherers, in turn, have little incentive
to explain the implications of the proposed legislation to
signers, as their financial interests are best served by
providing simplistic answers to complex questions and
reassuring signers that they are backing a worthwhile cause."
Recent initiatives, often involving divisive social issues, have
also been marked by misleading rhetoric and expensive
advertising campaigns. 8 Thus, the initiative process is at risk
of becoming captive of special interests. 9
The initiative process offers a special advantage for well-
funded special interest groups. Absent competing propositions,
voters are given only two choices. For example, when Proposition
161, advocating the legalization of physician-assisted suicide, was
on the ballot in California, a voter might have had legitimate con-
cerns about the absence of adequate procedural safeguards
ers, utilities and oil companies contributed large amounts of money to the Proposition
13 campaign); see also Pamela J. Podger, The Big Ballot, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 6, 1996, at
Al (asserting that the Progressives would be shocked at the current state of the ini-
tiative process because it is dominated by special interest money); see, e.g., Stanton,
supra note 14, at Al (asserting that in 1994 tobacco lobbyists spent an estimated $18
million in an effort to pass an initiative which would have weakened anti-smoking
ordinances).
16. Five percent of the number of voters in the last gubernatorial election is re-
quired if the initiative is a statute; eight percent is required for a constitutional
amendment. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b). The signature requirement is intended to
keep "frivolous" or "unreasonably narrow propositions" off the ballot. MAGLEBY, supra
note 12, at 41. But given the expansion in California's population, the number of sig-
natures required has increased from about 53,000 to several hundred thousand. See
Stanton, supra note 14, at Al.
17. See MAGLEBY, supra note 12, at 63 ("Petition circulators in both the Common
Cause and the farmworkers' cases framed the requests so as to maximize the likeli-
hood of signing: 'Want to stop corrupt politics?' and 'Want to help the farmworkers?' In
an effort to play upon the conforming tendencies in most people, circulators also en-
courage quick signing rather than discussion.').
18. See Kelso, supra note 3, at 341 (citing David B. Magleby's finding that most of
the information voters gather regarding initiatives comes directly from television,
radio, and newspapers); Vitiello, supra note 5, at 1679-85; see also Ray Rodriguez,
Prop. 209 Was Created to Aid Republicans, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Oct. 30,
1996, at B9 (criticizing the Republican party for using Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in
campaign advertisement for Proposition 209, which sought to end affirmative action
in California).
19. See Kelso, supra note 3, at 338-39 (asserting that the financial resources
available to special interest groups create an exceptional ability to draw media atten-
tion to popular causes and stating, "[i]f the initiative was to be an antidote for
government by the corrupt, then the result appears to have been government by the
uninformed").
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within the initiative." Voters have only a limited opportunity to
lobby the drafters of an initiative to modify it or to amend of-
fending aspects of an initiative,2 resulting in the advertisement of
propositions in black and white terms.' Furthermore, once the
initiative is on the ballot, voters have no opportunity to register
anything less than complete support or opposition.'
The typical legislative process differs markedly from the ini-
tiative process. Although there is legitimate concern about
money influencing legislation,' a bill's proponents must al-
ways accommodate some competing interests to ensure the
bill's passage.' Thus, legislation is amended to avoid ambigu-
ity and to accommodate competing voices. 6 Except in unusual
periods of political domination by one party, legislation will
seldom command unquestioning support of a majority of the
27legislative body or avoid the accommodation resulting fromthe risk of veto by a disagreeing executive.28
20. See Dianne Gassman, R.N., Letter to the Editor, 161's Lack of Safeguards,
FRESNO BEE, Oct. 7, 1992, at B7 (expressing concern because Proposition 161 required
neither witnesses to be present when a person requested that her physician put her to
death nor family members or loved ones to be part of the patient's decision to die).
21. Once an initiative has qualified for the ballot, the Secretary of State sends
copies of the measure to the Senate and the Assembly. Each house then assigns the
proposed law to appropriate committees for the purpose of holding public hearings on
the subject of the measure. Although public comments are acknowledged at such
hearings, the legislature has no authority to make any of the proposed changes or to
prevent the measure from being submitted to the voters. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9034
(West 1996); see generally BILL JONES, SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT
INITIATIVE PROCESS HANDBOOK 2 (1997) (summarizing California's initiative proce-
dure and the requirements for preparing and qualifying initiatives).
22. See Vitiello, supra note 5, at 1678-85 (discussing misleading claims made by
supporters of Proposition 184).
23. See Gassman, supra note 20.
24. See Dan Bernstein, Did Money Smooth Path for Disputed bxic Bill?, SACRA-
MENTO BEE, July 17, 1995, at A9. Sacramento lobbyist Richard Ratciff states, "To my
mind, the money has always been a short-cut to get to the people. The sad part is it
does work. If you give $5,000 or $10,000 to a member, he certainly is going to remem-
ber that." Id.
25. See Kelso, supra note 3, at 339.
26. A recent example of a major piece of legislation subjected to significant com-
promise is the federal line-item veto. After facing seemingly irreconcilable differences
between the House and the Senate versions of the bill, the GOP congressional leader-
ship proposed a compromise version which was acceptable across the board. See
Another Perspective: A Line-Item Compromise, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Mar.
17, 1996, at D4.
27. One such period of unusual domination was enjoyed by the Democratic party
following President Nixon's resignation from the White House in 1974. The election of
seventy-five new democrats in 1974 has been viewed as America's response to a presi-
dential abuse of power and the ongoing Vietnam War. See All Things Considered
(National Public Radio broadcast, June 17, 1997).
28. See, e.g., David Espo, Late-Term Abortion Dividing Congress, Debate: Clinton
May Support Democratic Senator's Alternative Measure to GOP Bill, LONG BEACH
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Similar checks and balances do not exist within the initia-
tive process. The passage of Proposition 215 illustrates some of
the problems with the initiative process, relating to both the
lack of compromise 29 and to the exclusion of professional leg-
islative drafters.0 As a result, California voted for a flawed
proposition which was filled with ambiguity and which created
a series of complicated problems for lawyers and judges.
B. The Campaign for Proposition 215
Many California residents have supported medical use of
marijuana for a number of years.31 In both 199432 and 1995,3'
the legislature voted in favor of legislation recognizing the use
of marijuana for medical purposes. In both cases, however,
Governor Wilson vetoed the legislation despite significant
public support for the law.'
PRESS-TELEGRAM, May 14, 1997, at Al (reporting on President Clinton's threat to veto
a GOP-sponsored bill banning late-term abortions unless the bill was modified to take
women's health issues into account).
29. For example, Proposition 215 extends immunity to a wide variety of illnesses
for which marijuana may not be the most effective treatment. See discussion infra
Part I.C.3. Had its drafters been forced to compromise to secure support in the legisla-
ture, a more reasonable proposal would have been forthcoming. See, e.g., CALIFOR-
NIANS FOR COMPASSIONATE USE, BROCHURE (1996).
30. See discussion infra Part I.C.
31. See, e.g., Lisa M. Krieger, Medical Marijuana Vote Sends a Message: Big Win
for Backers of Drug Law Reform, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 7, 1991, at A12 (noting that the
city of San Francisco in 1991 overwhelmingly passed Proposition P, which urged state
officials to make marijuana legally available for medical use); Keith Stone, Marijuana:
Should Law Prevent Medicinal Uses?, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 8, 1992, at N1
(recognizing that when the city of Santa Cruz passed a ballot measure urging police
officials to look the other way with seriously ill persons caught possessing marijuana,
it was the third California county to do so).
32. See S.B. 1364, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal.). Authored by Senator Marks of
San Francisco, Senate Bill 1364 sought to have marijuana recognized as a Schedule II
drug, a controlled substance with a legitimate medical use. See id.
33. See A.B. 1529, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal.). Authored by Senator Vasconcellos
of San Jose, Assembly Bill 1529 was similar to Proposition 215 because it provided
that existing prohibitions against the possession or cultivation of marijuana would not
apply to persons possessing or cultivating the drug for their own personal medical
use. This exemption applied to persons who had obtained approval for such use in
writing from a physician. The exemption also extended to immediate family members,
legal guardians, and primary caregivers. See id.
34. See Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of the State of California, to the Cali-
fornia Senate (Sept. 30, 1994). Wilson asserted that he saw no reason to sign SB 1364
into law when it was certain to be preempted by existing federal law, which does not
recognize the medical use of marijuana. He further cited the FDA's findings that
orally administered THC was an effective medical treatment already available for
713
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As a result of Governor Wilson's strong stance against the
legalization of marijuana in any form, long time marijuana ac-
tivist Dennis Peron decided to resort to the initiative process. 5
Peron based the language of the initiative on earlier legisla-
tion, AB 1529, vetoed by Governor Wilson. 6 As illustrated
below, AB 1529 was more carefully drafted than Proposition
215. A long time advocate of legalization of marijuana, Peron
added potentially expansive language to Proposition 215 not
included in AB 1529. His hope was to assure support from
both those interested in medical use of marijuana and from
those in favor of the unrestricted legalization of marijuana.37
While Peron's Californians for Compassionate Use took
credit for writing the initiative, Californians for Medical Rights
led the campaign for its passage." Peron has represented
himself as a sort of Don Quixote39 battling against the
establishment, an image consistent with the original concept
prescription in California. Finally, he expressed his concern for the state's physicians
and pharmacists whom he felt would be placed in danger of facing federal prosecution
for prescribing the drug. See id.; see also Greg Lucas, Medical Marijuana Bill Ap-
proved, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 19, 1994, at A20 (reporting that Governor Wilson's veto of
SB 1364 was no surprise, as the Governor was then embroiled in a re-election battle
with being tough on crime as his main platform).
In vetoing AB 1529, Governor Wilson wrote to the California Assembly, reminding
the legislature again of the FDA's approval only of orally administered tetrahydrocan-
nibol (THC). He also echoed the concerns of some of his GOP counterparts on the
floor, saying that the bill would "for all intent [sic] and purposes legalize possession
and cultivation in California." See Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of the State of
California, to the California Assembly (May 3, 1996) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/95-96/bill/asm/ab_1501-1550/ab_1529_vt960503.html> (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The Governor additionally expressed
concern for law enforcement officials, whose efforts, he felt, would be complicated by
providing a defense to users of marijuana. See id.
35. See Greg Lucas, Bill Flow Slows As Senate, Assembly Fight Over Funds, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 13, 1995, at A16 (observing that at a time when Governor Wilson's veto
of AB 1529 was still speculative, Dennis Peron claimed he had already drafted an
initiative to make marijuana legal for seriously ill patients).
36. See Interview with Dennis Peron, President of Californians for Compassion-
ate Use 4 (Mar. 5, 1997) [hereinafter Peron Interview] (explaining that he used the
wording from SB 1364, from 1994, and AB 1529, from 1995, in writing the language
for Proposition 215) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
37. See id. at 9.
38. See Dennis Peron, Yes on Prop. 215: A Mission of Mercy, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct.
20, 1996, at C15 (reporting that Dennis Peron co-drafted Proposition 215 because he
wanted to authorize medical use of marijuana as a eulogy for his lover, Jonathan, who
died of AIDS); see also Glen Martin, Squabble Among Medicinal Pot Initiative Backers,
S.F. CHRON., Sept. 4, 1996, at All (remarking that the proposition's co-author, John
Entwistle, was also a leader of the Cannabis Club with Dennis Peron).
39. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 968 (9th ed. 1989)
(defining "quixotic" as "foolishly impractical esp. in the pursuit of ideals").
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of the initiative process.40 In reality, the passage of the
proposition was significantly aided by the contributions raised
by Californians for Medical Rights."1 George Soros, a New York
philanthropist, contributed $350,000 to the campaign; George
Zimmer, owner of the Men's Warehouse clothing stores,
contributed $160,000; Peter Lewis, president of Ohio's
Progressive Corporation, contributed $300,000; and Laurance
Rockefeller, brother of the late Vice President Nelson A.
42Rockefeller, donated $50,000 to the campaign.
Armed with over $1,000,000, the Californians for Medical
Rights group secured about 850,000 signatures, well in excess
of the required 433,000. 43 The campaign was well run, but the
significance of the unorganized and inadequately funded oppo-
sition should not be understated." The lack of serious
opposition may also be explained by miscalculations about
Proposition 215's likelihood of passage.45 Opponents raised
concerns about the effect of Proposition 215, but their lack of
organization and resources meant their voices were drowned
out by the proposition's supporters.
Substantial funding also allowed proponents of Proposition
215 to develop an effective advertising campaign glossing over
the serious problems created by Proposition 215. Unquestion-
ably, some of Proposition 215's prime supporters were
interested in legalization of marijuana for general use, but the
40. See discussion supra Part I.A.
41. See Jim Herron Zamora, Pot Club Leaders Urged to Drop Out of Vote Drive:
Strife Reported Among Medical-Use Measure's Backers, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 4, 1996,
at A5 (declaring that the state recognized Californians for Medical Rights as Proposi-
tion 215's official sponsor even though Dennis Peron's Californians for Compassionate
Use wrote the initiative).
42. See Carey Goldberg, Currency King Gives Heavily to Groups Fighting Drug
Laws, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Sept. 12, 1996, at 14A; see also Eric Bailey,
California Elections: Proposition 215: 6 Wealthy Donors Aid Measure on Marijuana,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1996, at A18.
43. See Goldberg, supra note 42; CALIFORNIANS FOR COMPASSIONATE USE,
MEDICAL MARIJUANA: KNOW YOUR RIGHTS: THE COMPASSIONATE USE ACT EXPLAINED
(1996); Peron Interview, supra note 36, at 4 (explaining that the 850,000 signatures
constituted one-fifth of the votes needed for the Nov. 6, 1996 election).
44. See Goldberg, supra note 42; see also Interview with Brad Gates, Orange
County Sheriff (July 28, 1997) (stating that one reason Proposition 215 passed was
due to the inadequate funding, only $30,000, to educate the public of the pitfalls of the
initiative) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
45. See James W. Sweeney, County Solidly Backs Medicinal Marijuana: Bay Area
Support May Not Be Enough, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, Cal.), Sept. 18, 1996, at
Al. Stu Mollrich, campaign leader against Proposition 215, acknowledged the strong
support for the initiative in the San Francisco area but predicted it would not pass.
See id.
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campaign focused on "compassionate use,' 6 a powerful symbol
in support of its passage. Ballot literature emphasized that the
proposition would allow "seriously and terminally ill patients
to legally use marijuana, if, and only if, they have the approval
of a licensed physician,"47 which suggested limitations not
found in the text of the law. For example, section 11362.5, the
codification of Proposition 215, may be read to allow use of
marijuana by patients other than those seriously and terminally
ill, and the law contains no requirement that the recommenda-
tion to the patient come from a licensed physician.'
The campaign literature also suggests that marijuana would
be appropriate for a limited number of specific diseases, listing
cancer, glaucoma, AIDS, multiple sclerosis, epilepsy, and spinal
cord injuries. 9 Elsewhere, Peron's Californians for Compas-
sionate Use published a brochure stating that marijuana has
been shown to "help migraine headaches, relieve menstrual
cramps, help overcome insomnia, and mitigate withdrawal
from alcohol and other hard drugs."" Despite the campaign
literature's focus on the least controversial uses of medical
marijuana, catch-all language in the proposition creates an
ambiguity regarding the types of illnesses for which marijuana
may be recommended.51
Even if voters did not read the campaign literature distrib-
uted with the ballot initiative, the television ads, which were
largely unrebutted by the opposition, portrayed a similar im-
pression about the meaning of Proposition 215. Commercials
46. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(a) (West Supp. 1998) (explaining
that this section, formerly Proposition 215, shall be known and cited as "the Compas-
sionate Use Act of 1996"). Proponents released lists of diseases and their symptoms
which marijuana had been shown to alleviate. The proponents especially concentrated
on relief from AIDS wasting syndrome and nausea caused by chemotherapy. See
CALIFORNIANS FOR COMPASSIONATE USE, BROCHURE (1996). Proponents also mini-
mized the effectiveness of Marinol by stating that patients vomited when they took
the pill. See Eric Bailey, California Elections: Proposition 215: Initiative on Medical
Use of Marijuana Pits Unlikely Foes, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1996, at A3. In addition,
proponents published quotes from doctors supporting the use of medical marijuana.
See id. (quoting Dr. Richard Cohen, chief oncologist at California Pacific Hospital:
"[t]his medicine does no harm to the patient and is effective in relieving pain and nau-
sea").
47. See California Secretary of State, Vote '96: Arguments in Favor of Proposition
215 (visited Mar. 25, 1998) <http'lvote96.ss.ca.gov/Vote96/html/BP/215yearsarg.htm>
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
48. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 1998).
49. See California Secretary of State, supra note 47.
50. See CALIFORNIANS FOR COMPASSIONATE USE, BROCHURE (1996).
51. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1998); see
also discussion infra part I.C.3.
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played on the "compassionate use" theme, featuring a cancer
survivor who used marijuana to ease nausea, a doctor who
recommended marijuana to ailing patients, and a widow of a
cancer patient who had used marijuana."
Furthermore, the campaign in support of Proposition 215
was aided unintentionally by Attorney General Dan Lungren.
In August of 1996, Lungren authorized a raid of Peron's Can-
nabis Buyers Club.53 On October 11, 1996, less than a month
before the election, Peron and others at the club were arrested
for possession and transportation of marijuana and main-
taining a place to furnish marijuana.54 Many viewers perceived
the raid as an abuse of power improperly brought against a
person trying to serve the needs of the seriously ill.55
Proposition 215 had many powerful emotional arguments in
its favor, as dying patients in need of palliative care justifiably
evoked sympathy, but Proposition 215 encompassed much
more than care for seriously ill or dying patients. Courts may
eventually interpret the law narrowly to require a showing of
serious and terminal illness, but the Act itself is not limited to
serious or terminal illness,56 and its drafters intended a
broader meaning.57 As is increasingly common in campaigns in
support of initiatives, the campaign surrounding Proposition
215 played on passion and demonstrated a casual approach, at
best, to the hard issues raised by the initiative. 8
52. See Bailey, supra note 42.
53. See Larry D. Hatfield and Eric Brazil, S.F Pot Club Leader Held on Drug
Charges: Surprise Bust By State Agents, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 11, 1996, at Al; Glen
Martin and Maitland Zane, Pot Measure Author Arrested, Charges From Raid on S.F
Buyers' Club, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 12, 1996, at Al.
54. See Hatfield & Brazil, supra note 53.
55. See id. (quoting San Francisco District Attorney Terence Hallinan as saying,
"lilt is a clear abuse of the prosecutorial power of an indictment being used for politi-
cal purposes to affect an outcome of an election').
56. See discussion infra Part I.C.3.
57. See discussion supra Introduction; Part I.B.
58. See discussion supra Part I.B. Opponents of Proposition 215 also played on
passions, describing the initiative as an attempt at legalizing drugs and downplaying
stories of patients who claimed relief from using marijuana. They also claimed that
passage of Proposition 215 would send the wrong message to children by implying
that marijuana is a safe medicine rather than a dangerous drug. See CITIZENS FOR A
DRUG-FREE CALIFORNIA, No ON 215: DON'T LEGALIZE MARIJUANA (1996).
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C. The Ambiguities of Proposition 215
Proposition 215 was drafted by laymen who did not engage
in the traditional give and take process which allows legisla-
tion to evolve. The drafters also lacked the aid of a large
legislative staff. Consequently, Proposition 215 has created
considerable confusion.
Proposition 215, codified as the Compassionate Use Act of
1996 in Health and Safety Code § 11362.5, contains several
provisions. First, it requires a physician to determine that a
person's health would benefit from the use of marijuana.59 The
statute states that the physician may recommend the use of
marijuana for the treatment of "cancer, anorexia, AIDS,
chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any
other illness for which marijuana provides relief."' Second, the
statute creates immunity for patients and "their primary care-
givers" who obtain and use marijuana upon the recommenda-
tion of a physician.61 Third, the statute includes an exhortation
to state and federal governments to provide for a safe supply
of marijuana for medical use.62 Fourth, it protects a physician
who complies with the provisions of the act from punishment
or denial of other rights or privileges.63 Fifth, it states that
specified code sections relating to marijuana possession and
cultivation do not apply to patients and their primary caregiv-
ers who possess or cultivate marijuana for personal use upon a
written or oral recommendation from a physician.6' Finally, the
statute defines a "primary caregiver" as an "individual desig-
nated by the person exempted under this section who has
consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health, or
safety of that person." '
Prior to the 1996 election, some prominent leaders refused
to support Proposition 215 because of its ambiguity or "loose"
language.6' During legislative hearings on the initiative, critics
59. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1998).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. See id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(B).
62. See id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(C).
63. See id. § 11362.5(c).
64. See id. § 11362.5(d).
65. Id. § 11362.5(e).
66. For example, United States Senator Dianne Feinstein refused to support
Proposition 215, fearing that the initiative "could open the door to much more than
compassionate use of marijuana for the terminally ill. It contains dangerous loopholes
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argued that the initiative contained numerous loopholes. 7 This
section reviews a number of statutory terms that critics of
Proposition 215 have identified as ambiguous. This section
also attempts to distinguish between political rhetoric and se-
rious problems created by Proposition 215.
1. Physicians-Proposition 215 does not define the term
"physician."68 Critics of the measure argued during legislative
hearings on the initiative that "the so-called recommendation
could be from a physician in the country of Bolivia, Russia, or
some other Third World Country that really has no medical
standirds."69 Alternatively, proponents of a broad interpreta-
tion of Proposition 215 urge reliance on the dictionary
definition of the term. One meaning of a "physician" is a per-
son "skilled in the art of healing."0 A broad interpretation of
the term "physician" would add significantly to the scope of the
legislation. A wide variety of professionals are skilled in the
art of healing, including chiropractors, homeopaths, and a va-
riety of therapists. Other less conventional healers may also
qualify under such broad language.7
that will hinder law enforcement against drug dealers and encourage recreational
drug use among teenagers." Muriel Dobbin, Senate Hearing Bashes Medical Pot Laws,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 3, 1996, at A4.
67. "Proposition 215 is a dangerously deceptive initiative filled with legal loop-
holes which would legalize the widespread cultivation and use of marijuana in
California behind the smoke screen of medical use." Hearing on Proposition 215: Joint
Senate Health and Human Services Comm. and Senate Crim. Proc. Comm., 1995-
1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal.) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement by Stu Mollrich, Con-
sultant to Citizens for a Drug-Free California).
68. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 1998).
69. Joint Hearings, supra note 67 (statement of Orange County District Attorney
Michael Capizzi). He also argued that
It has to be recommended by a physician, but it could be a physician recom-
mending it in an underground newspaper that published it once a week. There's
no requirement that it be a physician recommending it for a specific patient. It
could be just a patient, a doctor, physician, from another country writing an ar-
ticle, recommending it, for people who have any of these illnesses.
Id. That was rebutted by San Francisco District Attorney Terence Hallinan when he
suggested that the law requires that the physician must make a recommendation to a
specific individual. See id. (statement of Terence Hallinan).
70. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 887 (9th ed. 1989).
71. Homeopaths, for example, profess to have the ability to heal persons who "can't
be helped by conventional medical care." See Steve Waldstein, Homeopathy: Natural
Health Care (visited July 27, 1997) <httpj/www.dimensional.com/-stevew/> (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). However, homeopaths are not
regulated by state or federal law. It is also interesting to note that neither a physical
nor a doctor-patient relationship is required in order for a physician recommendation
to be made. This has led opponents of Proposition 215 to fear that mass recommenda-
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How the courts define "physician" is significant. If courts
adopt the dictionary definition, state and federal law enforce-
ment officials lose a considerable measure of their ability to
control distribution of marijuana. For example, the initial fed-
eral response to Proposition 215 was to threaten licensed
physicians with revocation of their privilege to write prescrip-
tions if they violated federal law by prescribing marijuana.72
The deterrent force of the threat is lost, however, if unregu-
lated "physicians" fall within a broad interpretation of the
statute, as a shaman73 may care little whether or not he is
authorized to treat Medicare patients.
The types of illnesses for which marijuana may be pre-
scribed is also open to broad interpretation.74 Permitting a
variety of unconventional healers to recommend marijuana
may indirectly influence the types of conditions for which
marijuana may be recommended. For example, the types of ill-
nesses for which a licensed medical practitioner might
legitimately recommend marijuana are quite limited. Signifi-
cant anecdotal studies suggest that some cancer patients and
AIDS patients respond well to smoking marijuana, whereas
alternatives like Marinol do not provide similar relief.7 Be-
yond that, however, licensed medical practitioners may not be
willing to recommend marijuana because they consider mari-
juana's benefits too limited and its risks too great.76 Other
tions from "Third World" doctors in "underground newspapers" will satisfy the broad
language of the statute. See Joint Hearings, supra note 67, at 34-36 (Testimony of
Orange County District Attorney Mike Capizzi).
72. See Kate Zernike, Anti-Pot Plan Aimed at Doctors Due Today: Clinton's Drug
Czar Seeks to Counter California, Arizona Initiatives, FRESNO BEE, Dec. 30, 1996, at
A4 (acknowledging that Federal Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey appeared on national
television to announce his plan to strip the prescription licenses of doctors who pre-
scribed marijuana to their patients).
73. A "shaman" is "a priest who uses magic for the purpose of curing the sick, di-
vining the hidden, and controlling events." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1081 (9th ed. 1989).
74. For example, the earliest written reference to medical use of marijuana ap-
peared in the Chinese Pharmacopeia in the 15th Century, B.C. See KEVIN B. ZEESE,
COMMON SENSE FOR DRUG POLICY, RESEARCH FINDINGS ON MEDICINAL PROPERTIES OF
MARIJUANA 2 (1997). The Chinese used marijuana to treat maladies ranging from
constipation to rheumatism, while Indians, Africans, ancient Greeks, and medieval
Europeans used marijuana to treat fevers, dysentery, and malaria. See Matthew W.
Grey, Comment, Medical Use of Marijuana: Legal and Ethical Conflicts in the Pa-
tient/Physician Relationship, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 249, 251 (1996).
75. See ZEESE, supra note 74, at 5 (citing the Chang & Sallen studies, finding
that other studies comparing smoked marijuana to synthetic THC have found the
former much more effective).
76. Physicians face several dilemmas when deciding whether to recommend
marijuana to a patient. A decision not to recommend the drug may be considered a
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healers, on the other hand, might not be constrained by the
same kinds of methodologies or professional ethics as the li-
censed practitioner."
Under traditional maxims of statutory construction, a court
might give "physician" its dictionary meaning. 8 Courts justify
their use of dictionary meanings on the assumption that, ab-
sent contrary evidence, the legislature (or here, the voters)
must have intended the common use of the relevant term as
reflected in its dictionary meaning.79 Such a result would be
unfortunate, however, because it would increase the opportuni-
ties for abuse of the law.
A second argument supports a narrow reading of "phy-
sician" and demonstrates the hyperbole engaged in by oppo-
nents of Proposition 215. Proposition 215 appears in the
Health and Safety Code. Elsewhere in the Code, "physicians"
are defined as "persons who are licensed to practice their re-
spective professions in this state."0 Adopting such a narrow
definition would limit the category of qualified people who
might recommend marijuana by requiring that healers be li-
censed.81
The California Supreme Court has not yet spoken defini-
tively on how courts should interpret initiatives. The court has
stated that "[tihe power of the initiative must be liberally con-
strued ... to promote the democratic process." s One scholar
has argued, however, that the court's process of interpretation
regarding other specific initiatives shows more restraint.'
decision to discontinue treatment for a patient who has failed to respond to other
drugs. On the other hand, a decision to recommend marijuana creates a host of legal
and medical risks for the patient. For example, all patients risk being prosecuted for
possession of marijuana, and immune-deficient patients risk developing respiratory
problems caused by the carcinogens that smoked marijuana produces. See Grey, supra
note 74, at 255.
77. See id. at 259 (acknowledging that a medical doctor is bound by the Hippo-
cratic oath which provides that physicians "will keep patients from harm and
injustice").
78. Cf Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 US. 170, 177-79 (1993) (giving the dictionary
meaning to the words "conduct" and "participate" in construing provisions of RICO).
79. See id. at 178-79 (finding that if Congress had intended a meaning other
than the common dictionary usage, it had the opportunity to indicate such an alter-
nate meaning).
80. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11024 (West 1991) ("'Physician,' 'dentist,'
'podiatrist,' 'pharmacist,' and 'veterinarian' mean persons who are licensed to practice
their respective professions in this state.").
81. See California Secretary of State, supra note 47.
82. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583
P.2d 1281, 1283 (Cal. 1978).
83. See Kelso, supra note 3, at 362 (citing Proposition 13 as the best example of a
judicial tendency to construe initiatives narrowly).
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One such restraint is the court's reliance on ballot analysis
and arguments in its interpretation of the initiative.' Insofar
as California's courts rely on such materials, they might be
able to limit the scope of Proposition 215. The campaign litera-
ture explicitly limited Proposition 215 to licensed physicians,
and limiting the law to licensed physicians prevents some of
its potential breadth. As indicated, the types of illnesses for
which marijuana might be appropriate may depend on the
healer's training,8 as licensed physicians with medical train-
ing are subjected to limitations created by their professional
training and by their fear of federal sanctions.
The potential ambiguity of the term "physician" was raised
during the hearings." Such ambiguity could have been readily
resolved during the legislative process, and the use of profes-
sional drafters could have avoided legal uncertainty and
potential misinterpretation by the courts. Instead, Proposition
215 is filled with ambiguities because the initiative process
lacks the flexibility to avoid such problems if they arise after
the initiative has qualified for the ballot.
2. Primary Caregivers-Even more ambiguous than the
term "physician" is the term "primary caregiver," the only term
defined in the Act. 9 The immunity from prosecution extended
to "primary caregivers" presumably applies only to possession,
as opposed to use, of marijuana.'
84. See id. at 358 (suggesting that reliance on campaign literature is "contrary to
both common sense and empirical research," because evidence suggests that voters do
not rely on the ballot literature). One might make a stronger argument that adver-
tisements in support of the initiative are better evidence of the voters' understanding
of what they have intended.
85. In fact, the opening statement to the Argument in Favor of Proposition 215
appearing in the ballot pamphlet read, "Proposition 215 will allow seriously and ter-
minally ill patients to legally use marijuana, if, and only if, they have the approval of a
licensed physician." California Secretary of State, supra note 47.
86. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
87. See discussion supra Part I.C. 1.
88. See Joint Hearings, supra note 67.
89. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(e) (West Supp. 1998) ("For the
purposes of this section, 'primary caregiver' means the individual designated by the
person exempted under this section who has consistently assumed responsibility for
the housing, health, or safety of that person.").
90. Section 1i362.5(b)(1)(B) states that the law is "[t]o ensure that patients and
their primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes upon the
recommendation of a physician are not subject to criminal prosecution or sanction."
Id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(B). To avoid ambiguity, the section might have provided immunity
only for "patients who obtain and use marijuana" and "caregivers who obtain mari-
juana for qualifying patients." Other language, such as the requirement in
§ 11362.5(b)(1)(A) that the use be for medical purposes, makes it sufficiently clear that
the section does not give the caregiver immunity from prosecution for her use of
[VOL. 31:3
Proposition 215
Obvious examples exist as to who ought to have immunity
from prosecution under Proposition 215's primary caregiver
provision. For example, seriously ill patients who are bedrid-
den must rely on a spouse, significant other, or trusted friend
to secure their medicine. The law avoids placing these people
in a cruel dilemma of committing a crime by aiding their loved
ones.9' Dennis Peron, draftsman of the proposition and its
most visible proponent, has argued that his Cannabis Cultiva-
tors Club qualifies as a "primary caregiver" within the
meaning of subsection 11362(e).9" This interpretation is not
obvious from the express language of the statute.93
A "primary caregiver," as defined in Proposition 215, is one
who has "assumed responsibility for the housing, health, or
safety" of a qualified patient.94 The requirements of assuming
responsibility for "housing," "health," and "safety" are disjunc-
tive, so the Cannabis Cultivators Club's failure to provide for a
person's housing is not controlling. Providing for a person's
"safety" is certainly an open-ended concept, but it is hard to
understand how a facility like the Cannabis Cultivators Club,
open only a few hours a day,95 can take primary responsibility
for its users' safety.
marijuana. See id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(A). As a practical matter, if the caregiver smokes
marijuana with the qualifying patient in private, imagining how the police might de-
tect the crime is difficult. Furthermore, even if the caregiver is arrested for possession
of marijuana and has not used the marijuana in front of the police, it is hard to
imagine that a district attorney would be able to proceed to trial against the caregiver,
if the other statutory elements are satisfied. One California court has already noted
some of the absurd results that might follow from the caregiver provision of the stat-
ute. See People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 571 (1997) ("For example, the voters
could not have intended that a dying cancer patient's 'primary caregiver' could be
subject to criminal sanctions for carrying otherwise legally-cultivated and possessed
marijuana down a hallway to the patient's room.').
91. See Diana Greigo Erwin, Mail's No Place For Medicinal Pot, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Aug. 12, 1997, at B1 (quoting Dr. Jerome P. Kassirer's Jan. 30, 1997, editorial in
the New England Journal of Medicine: "The alleviation of distress can be so striking
that some patients and their families have been willing to risk a jail term to obtain or
grow the marijuana.').
92. In fact, California Superior Court Judge David Garcia wrote in his order
modifying the preliminary injunction issued against the club that, "Defendants may
possess and cultivate medicinal marijuana ... for the personal medicinal use of per-
sons who have designated the defendants as their primary caregiver pursuant to
Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (e) whose physician has recommended or approved
the use of medicinal marijuana either orally or in writing to the defendants." People v.
Dennis Peron, Docket No. 980105, Jan. 10, 1997.
93. The First District Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in People ex
rel. Lungren v. Peron, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
94. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(e) (West Supp. 1998).
95. See Glen Martin, The Tokin' Joint Inside the Cannabis Cultivators' Club, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 24, 1997, at 1/Z1 (noting that Dennis Peron's San Francisco club is open
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Insofar as the Cannabis Cultivators Club provides people
with marijuana, one might argue it has assumed responsibility
for its members' health, but the claim that the club is the
"primary" entity in charge of its members' health still seems
doubtful. Seriously ill patients need a wide variety of medical
treatments beyond the use of marijuana. For example, a cancer
patient who uses marijuana to combat chemotherapy-induced
nausea must have a host of health care professionals who
share a much greater responsibility for his or her health than
Dennis Peron's organization. The Cannabis Cultivators Club
also provides a very narrow kind of care. Unlike a spouse or
close friend who may offer a wide array of nurturing for the
sick person, the club offers only marijuana and a gathering
place for occasional socializing.96
The potential for abuse under Proposition 215 expands as
each term is given a broad interpretation. Liberal interpreta-
tion of the term "primary caregiver" creates a large class of
healthy people authorized to possess marijuana, and it takes
very little imagination to see how abuse may result under such
a proposition. 97
3. "[Ainy other illness:" Is all use of marijuana medical?-
One of the primary concerns about Proposition 215 stems from
the language of subsection 11362.5(b)(1)(A) of the California
Health and Safety Code, which states that marijuana may be
recommended for a person suffering from "any other illness for
four hours a day on Monday through Thursday, and eight hours on Friday, serving
between 500 and 1,000 patrons per day).
96. Peron notes: "[The Cannabis Cultivators Club] is a support group-I think of
it as a giant therapy session." Peron Interview, supra note 36.
97. The characterization of Peron's Club as a "primary caregiver" has evoked
skepticism from at least one observer: "A cynical listener might discern [in Dennis
Peron's speech] an attitude that seems less like that of the nurturing caregiver, and
more like that of... an old pothead eager for the good times to roll again." Hanna
Rosin, The Return of Pot: California Gears Up for a Long, Strange Trip, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Feb. 17, 1997, at 19. As discussed below, suppliers may be able to avoid
prosecution under the doctrine of necessity. See discussion infra Part I.E.3. Whether
or not suppliers are covered by the act, however, the ambiguity in the status of suppli-
ers offers an example of how easily a serious legal issue might have been avoided, but
wasn't, due to amateur drafting. Professional drafters, interested in avoiding unneces-
sary litigation, could easily have clarified the status of suppliers if the bill had been
adopted by the legislature. In addition, other problems exist that could have been
resolved through the legislative process without much difficulty; for example, Proposi-
tion 215 does not indicate the amount of marijuana that may be possessed for
personal use. A simple solution would be a reference to section 11357 of the California
Health and Safety Code, which would make possession of less than 28.5 grams of
marijuana a misdemeanor, and section 11359, which would make possession of mari-
juana for sale a felony. See People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 568 (1997); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11357, 11359 (West 1991).
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which marijuana provides relief."98 Legitimate concerns about
the scope of such broad language heightened when Dennis
Peron announced that all use of marijuana is medical.9 Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that some members of the cannabis
cultivators' clubs take his view seriously.10°
The residents of California voted for legislation billed as a
compassionate way to provide marijuana for medical use."1 It
was not a referendum on the legalization of marijuana. Yet the
potentially liberal construction of the "any other illness" lan-
guage, combined with limited federal resources °2 and the
concerns of law enforcement about their liability in false arrest
suits,1"3 creates a risk of de facto legalization for many mari-
juana users.
In addition, Proposition 215 contributes to the de facto le-
galization of marijuana because a large number of marijuana
users may be able to find a sympathetic physician willing to
interpret "any illness" broadly, thereby giving them a colorable
claim of immunity. For such a class of patients, marijuana pos-
session and use may now be lawful as a matter of state law."
Whether the de facto legalization of marijuana lasts will de-
pend on how broadly California's courts interpret "any other
illness." Some commentators have argued that even trivial
98. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1998).
99. Peron was quoted as saying, "I believe all marijuana use is medical--except
for kids." Marijuana for the Sick, Editorial, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 30, 1996, at A14.
When asked in a later interview whether he regretted making the statement, Peron
replied, "NO WAY do I regret it. I believe 90 percent to 100 percent of marijuana use
is medical." Rosin, supra note 97, at 22.
100. Many of the clients of the Cannabis Cultivators Club in San Francisco have
questionable medical need for the drug. For example, one client, responding to a ques-
tion about whether marijuana helped the migraine headaches for which she professed
to use the drug, replied, "I use it as prevention. I have not had my weekly headache
since childhood. It has to be really good bud, and it relaxes me. It takes me to a higher
spiritual place. It's part of my religious belief; it's a sacrament." Rosin, supra note 97,
at 20.
101. Proponents of Proposition 215 ran television commercials emphasizing their
desire for compassionate use. The commercials included a breast cancer survivor who
used marijuana to ease nausea, a doctor who prescribed marijuana to ailing patients,
and the widow of a cancer patient who used marijuana to ease his struggle. See Bai-
ley, supra note 42; James Ricci, Voters Get Last Word, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at B1.
102. See Public Health: Reno Says Prescribing Marijuana Illegal Under Federal
Law Despite State Actions, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Dec. 31, 1996, available in
LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAHCD File [hereinafter Public Health] (acknowledging At-
torney General Janet Reno's admission that the federal government does not have the
resources "to absorb all the case load of state and local law enforcement").
103. See discussion infra Part I.E.
104. Some jurors already appear sympathetic even to questionable claims of
medical uses of marijuana. See Hung Jury Frees Man In Pot-Growing Case: Podiatrist
Claimed Plants Were Medicinal, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 22, 1997, at B3.
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ailments might come within the meaning of "any other ill-
ness." ' °c One opponent of Proposition 215 interpreted "any
other illness" to include "stress, headaches, backaches, upset
stomach or any other minor ailment.""~ Another opponent
suggested that "anxiety" and "menstrual cramps" might come




Thus, the phrase "any other illness" is extremely open-ended
and needs to be interpreted by the courts.
Competing arguments regarding this language must be rec-
ognized. First, Proposition 215 explicitly states that marijuana
must provide relief for the illness."°s Such language clearly im-
poses certain limitations on the illnesses for which marijuana
may be recommended, but such limitations lead to additional
difficulties in determining what will be considered "relief for
the illness."
For example, one might argue that the statute requires
marijuana to be a recognized treatment for particular illnesses.
Yet due to the settled efforts of the federal government,1" there
are no officially recognized medical uses of marijuana. Hence,
the statutory language cannot be interpreted to mean that
only uses in the United States Pharmacopoeia or uses recog-
nized by federal law are within the meaning of the statute.
This view is supported by the fact that none of the illnesses
specified in the statute are recognized by the federal govern-
ment as illnesses for which the use of marijuana is medically
acceptable. " ° Consequently, the requirement that marijuana
105. See Vincent J. Schodolski, In California, Debate Rages Over Easing Mari-
juana Law in Medical Cases, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 3, 1996, at 3 (quoting Robert Elsberg,
Chairman of Narcotics and Alcohol Committee of California Peace Officers Associa-
tion: "[w]hat (the 'any other illness' language] has done is to open it up to be
prescribed for anything from cancer to a sore thumb").
106. Joint Hearings, supra note 67, at 8 (statement of Stu Molirich).
107. See Joint Hearings, supra note 67 (quotation from Dr. Michael Meyers,
Board-certified family practitioner and UCLA faculty member in the Department of
Family Medicine).
108. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETy CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1998)
(stating that one of the purposes of the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 is "[tlo ensure
that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical
purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has been recommended
by a physician who has determined that the person's health would benefit from the
use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity,
glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides re-
lief").
109. See discussion infra Part II.A-B.
110. Marijuana is recognized as a Schedule I drug under federal law. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 812 (1994). This classification denotes that the drug has a high potential for abuse,
that no currently accepted medical use for the drug exists, and that there is a lack of
accepted safety for use of the drug under medical supervision. See id.
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provide relief must presumably find support in some medical
literature.
Additional interpretations of the statute's capacious lan-
guage are possible. Courts might limit the language to mean
that marijuana may be recommended only for conditions
where supporting studies suggest that marijuana provides re-
lief. Such an interpretation would allow many options for a
recommending physician.' A broad interpretation would leave
the determination to the physician's discretion, thereby con-
firming the fears of the opponents of Proposition 215 who were
concerned about the large loophole created by the law.
Proposition 215 also lends itself to a far narrower interpre-
tation than that suggested by either Peron or the measure's
opponents. The narrower interpretation focuses on the lan-
guage, also found in subsection (A), stating that the law's
provisions apply to "seriously ill Californians,""' thereby
eliminating some of the proposed loopholes dealing with cases
that do not involve seriously ill people.
If California courts focus on the ballot initiative literature
and legislative hearings to determine the meaning of Proposi-
tion 215, an additional principled basis exists upon which "any
other illness" might be limited. Testimony before the Joint
Senate Health and Human Services Committee and Senate
Criminal Procedures Committee supports the conclusion that
111. In reviewing medical literature from the nineteenth century alone, one re-
port cited
[niumerous reports in the literature describ[ing] [marijuana's] therapeutic ef-
fectiveness over an extensive range of ailments, including- gynecological
disorders such as excessive menstrual cramps and bleeding, treatment and
prophylaxis of migraine headaches, alleviation of withdrawal symptoms of
opium and chloral hydrate addiction, tetanus, insomnia, delirium tremens,
muscle spasms, strychnine poisoning, asthma, cholera, dysentery, labor pain,
psychosis, spasmatic cough, excess anxiety, gastrointestinal cramps, depression,
nervous tremors, bladder irritation, and psychosomatic illness.
SUBCOMMIFEE ON ALCOHOLISM & NARCOTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND
WELFARE, 92D CONG., REPORT ON MARLJUANA AND HEALTH 53-54 (1971)(citations
omitted) [hereinafter REPORT ON MARIJUANA AND HEALTH].
The report then noted that contemporary experiments had considered marijuana or
its synthetic analogues as "treatment [for] the withdrawal of the chronic alcoholic";
that unripe Cannabis extracts showed "antibiotic activity"; that "[olther THC ana-
logues may prove to be valuable agents for the treatment of high blood pressure and
uncontrollable fevers"; and that marijuana might be beneficial for terminal cancer
patients since its effects include "stimulation of appetite, euphoria, increased sense of
well-being, mild analgesia and an indifference to pain... ." Id.
112. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1998).
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the initiative should be limited to serious illnesses.11 Fur-
thermore, the ballot pamphlet explicitly stated that the
initiative would allow seriously and terminally ill patients to
use marijuana for palliative care.
114
Courts will be forced to make such distinctions, regardless of
whether or not they are the best body to make the relevant
decisions. Recourse through the legislative process instead of
the initiative process, however, would have allowed policy
makers to draft far superior legislation.
The claim that the legislature might have avoided some of
the initiative's ambiguous language is not merely theoretical
in the case of Proposition 215. Peron and his co-drafter mod-
eled Proposition 215 on earlier legislation that Governor
Wilson had vetoed. 15 Assembly Bill 1529 contained certain
ambiguities. For example, it lacked a limit on the amount of
marijuana a person might possess."' The key terms, including
illnesses for which marijuana treatment methods might be
recommended,117 were properly limited to avoid the kind of le-
gal controversies identified above.
The hearings held by Joint Senate Health and Human
Services and Senate Criminal Procedures Committee provide
additional evidence that the legislature could have avoided
some of Proposition 215's ambiguities. Hearings are required
under the California Elections Code once an initiative has
qualified for the ballot, but the purpose of those hearings is
limited."' The hearing has an educational function for the
public and the media, but the legislature cannot correct a
poorly drafted initiative."' During the Joint Committee hear-
ings, witnesses discussed the ambiguity and argued about the
correct interpretation of the initiative.2 0 In fact, the chair of
the hearings, obviously aware of the ambiguity of the initia-
113. See Joint Hearings, supra note 67.
114. See California Secretary of State, supra note 47.
115. A pamphlet by Californians for Compassionate Use states: 'The Compassion-
ate Use Act of 1996 [Proposition 215] is based on AB 1529, the medical marijuana bill
sponsored by Assemblyman John Vasconcellos." CALIFORNIANS FOR COMPASSIONATE
USE, THE COMPASSIONATE USE AcT OF 1996 (1996).
116. AB. 1529, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal.).
117. See id. (explaining that AB 1529 limited the availability of medical mari-
juana to cancer, AIDS, glaucoma, and multiple sclerosis patients).
118. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9034 (West 1996).
119. See id. ("The appropriate committees shall hold joint public hearings on the
subject of such measure prior to the date of the election at which the measure is to be
voted upon .... Nothing in this section shall be construed as authority for the Legis-
lature to alter the initiative measure or prevent it from appearing on the ballot.").
120. See Joint Hearings, supra note 67.
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tive, even asked a number of witnesses how they would rem-
edy the initiative's uncertainties.
121
D. Confusion Caused by What Proposition 215 Did Not Say
Not only was Proposition 215 poorly drafted, but it also
failed to address a number of important legal questions. If
Proposition 215's proponents had used traditional legislative
channels, other interest groups might have forced the law's
proponents to address the omitted legal and policy issues."
Dennis Peron has stated candidly that he favors legalization
of marijuana, 123 and other supporters share that sentiment. 2'
Yet Proposition 215 was sold to the voters as a statute
authorizing medicalization of marijuana, not legalization. 5
The normal legislative process would have allowed both
greater clarity, and, assuming that the affected parties had
been willing to engage in political compromise, legislation that
did what the California public wanted without the unintended
possible consequence of de facto legalization. Decriminalizing
possession of marijuana raises important policy questions not
posed by the debate about medicalization of marijuana.126 Us-
ing the initiative process to achieve legalization without a full
public debate and consideration of the relevant costs is an ille-
gitimate use of the process.
This section reviews how Proposition 215 may lead to de
facto legalization of the possession of marijuana and also ad-
dresses some of the issues that might have been dealt with
121. Id.
122. See Kelso, supra note 3, at 339.
123. See Rosin, supra note 97, at 19 ("The movement is about the compassionate
extension of relief to sick people.., but it is also very much, and primarily, about
legalization.").
124. See id. at 19-20 (asking Jeff Jones, proprietor of a cannabis club located in
Oakland, California, one of the strictest cannabis clubs in the state, if marijuana
would make "anyone feel better," to which Mr. Jones replied, "Now you're getting the
point").
125. See California Secretary of State, supra note 47.
126. See, e.g., RICHARD LAWRENCE MILLER, THE CASE FOR LEGALIZING DRUGS 82-
83 (1991) (citing the following policy reasons for the legalization of drugs: increased
safety for police officers who risk their lives over "substances that cause no more
harm than beer or cigarettes"; an end to illicit profits that corrupt narcotics officers;
an end to the monitoring of private behavior within private homes; an end to the en-
forcement of morals by law enforcement officers; and an ease of the burden on
prosecutors, judges, and corrections officers).
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had the legislative process been used, thereby avoiding de
facto legalization.
1. Probable Cause and False Arrest-The federal govern-
ment has the power to enforce marijuana laws fully, and it is
not required to recognize the defense of medical necessity
authorized under Proposition 215.27 The federal government is
not interested, however, in monitoring possession of small
amounts of marijuana. Under current federal policy, federal
authorities do not prosecute marijuana cases unless the
amount of marijuana exceeds 1,000 pounds or 500 plants.
128
Following the 1996 election, federal drug Czar Barry McCaf-
frey promoted a plan which threatened physicians with
sanctions if they prescribed marijuana.1 29 Also, Attorney Gen-
eral Janet Reno promised that the federal government would
work with state officials to "ensure as full and complete en-
forcement of the federal law as possible,"30 despite her
admission that the federal government lacks the resources to
supplant local law enforcement efforts."'
Local police and prosecutors have already expressed concern
about the uncertain scope of Proposition 215. How does a po-
lice officer determine whether she has probable cause to arrest
a suspect who possesses marijuana?' 2 Some law enforcement
127. Federal law still makes possession and cultivation of marijuana an offense.
See 21 US.C. § 841 (1994). Nothing in section 11362.5 of the California Health and
Safety Code purports to overrule federal law on point, and there is no plausible argu-
ment that state law could preempt a federal law on point. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 1998).
128. See Eric Brazil, Federal Marijuana Law Will be Enforced Here: Conflicts Be-
tween US., State Lead to 'Legal Anarchy", S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 7, 1996, at A8 ("The
threshold for DEA involvement in marijuana arrests, set by the U.S. Attorney, is in
the range of 1,000 pounds or 500 plants .... ).
129. See Tim Golden, Reining in Medical Marijuana Laws: US. Warns Physicians
Who Supply Drug that They Face Prosecution, License Loss, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Dec. 23, 1996, at 1A.
130. Public Health, supra note 102.
131. See id.
132. Despite efforts by state officials and law enforcement officials to reach a con-
sensus concerning Proposition 215's implementation, communities have responded in
varying ways to what formerly were simple possession or cultivation arrests. See, e.g.,
Marilee Enge, Policing Agencies Differ on Pot Legality, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Mar. 7,
1997, at A9 (outlining attempts by various county police agencies to handle the new
law); Tyche Hendricks, Fremont Police Hip to Pot Laws: A Note From Driver's Doctor
Allows Him to Transport Plants, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 10, 1997, at 1B
(describing the experience of a man with four marijuana plants in his back seat whom
police pulled over but let go once he produced a doctor's note indicating that the drug
was to be used to relieve the patient's back pain and nausea); Keith Stone, State Offi-
cials Meet Today to Discuss Marijuana Measure, Prop. 215: Conflicting Laws Could
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officials argue that the possibility that an offender possesses
marijuana lawfully makes it difficult or impossible to prove
that a police officer had probable cause to search a suspect and
therefore will lead to the suppression of evidence and dis-
missal of prosecutions.
133
Furthermore, law enforcement officials have expressed con-
cern that they may be liable for false arrest if they arrest
suspects who possess marijuana for medical purposes.'" Con-
cern about personal liability for false arrest may deter police
from enforcing state marijuana laws.135 Police concern about
charges based on illegal searches may be overstated, however,
since officers are entitled to a good faith defense against such
charges.16 Even with such a defense, however, police may be
deterred from vigorous enforcement of marijuana laws because
of the risk of suit itself. Defending a lawsuit is expensive. Po-
lice in some cities may be further deterred because of concern
about the relevant jury pool. For example, given the enormous
support for Proposition 215 in San Francisco, the San Fran-
cisco police may be concerned that juries will reject assertions
of good faith and find against the police.1
37
Make Separating Legal and Illegal Pot Smokers Difficult, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 3,
1996, at A4.
133. The concern expressed in the text (or by Proposition 215's opponents) may be
overstated. For example, with regard to concern about the existence of probable cause,
an officer must only demonstrate that there is a "substantial chance" that the person
is engaged in a crime. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 US. 213, 243-44 n.13 (1983). Most
marijuana use is almost certainly not for medical use, notwithstanding Dennis Peron's
assertion that all use is medical use. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. There-
fore, an officer who observes a person in possession of marijuana almost certainly has
a basis for believing that the person possesses marijuana unlawfully. Because a prob-
able cause determination must be made on a case-by-case basis, a person's exit from a
cannabis club may not constitute probable cause. Nevertheless, a strong probability
remains that the suspect is violating the law unless additional information suggests
that the possessor is either a medical user or a medical caregiver.
134. See Dana Wilkie, Clouds Shroud Marijuana Laws, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Dec. 3, 1996, at A3 (discussing confusion among law enforcement officials concerning
the enforcement of marijuana laws and speculating about whether an officer would be
liable for an illegal seizure for confiscating marijuana possessed by a suspect who
claimed a medical need).
135. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) ("[Plermitting damages
suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs, including the
risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly in-
hibit officials in the discharge of their duties.").
136. See id. at 640-41 (holding that a law enforcement officer is entitled to quali-
fied immunity in a civil action under section 1983 if he reasonably believed his actions
were constitutional).
137. The San Francisco community is known for its support of the medicinal use
of marijuana and Proposition 215. See Glen Martin, Pot Case Transferred to S.F.:
Judge Moves it From Oakland-Prosecutor Angry, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 17, 1997, at A20
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Also contributing to the de facto legalization of possession of
marijuana is the Act's failure to impose any restrictions on
where a qualifying patient may possess marijuana.13 For
example, marijuana use by medical patients is not restricted
to use in health care facilities or to use while under medical
supervision. Free access to marijuana enables close associates
of the qualifying patient to share marijuana in the privacy of
the patient's home. Detection and arrest in that setting is
unlikely.'39 Thus, associates of qualifying patients may gain
(stating that San Francisco Attorney General Terence Hallinan supports Proposition
215 and noting Attorney General Dan Lungren's decision to prosecute Dennis Peron
and five co-defendants in Oakland, rather than in San Francisco, on charges stem-
ming from the August 1996 raid of the San Francisco cannabis club, perhaps because
he feared that San Francisco jurors would be "too lenient" with Dennis Peron); Eric
Brazil, California's Legalization of Medicinal Marijuana Stymies Law Officials, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 17, 1996, at 16 ("As a practical matter, lighting up a
joint in public has been winked at by law enforcement in California's major cities,
notably San Francisco, for some time.").
138. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West Supp. 1998). In a recent
case arising in the California state capital, a 25-year-old AIDS patient who carried a
note from his doctor and an identification card from a San Francisco cannabis buyers'
club was cited by police for smoking marijuana casually in a downtown mall. The Sac-
ramento County District Attorney's office decided not to prosecute the man because
his use was not illegal under Proposition 215. The DA's office also suggested that such
illicit public use could soon become illegal under local ordinance. See Jim Sanders, No
Charges in Medicinal Pot Case: Man Who Smoked Marijuana on K Street Mall Won't
Be Prosecuted, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 28, 1997, at Bi; cf People v. Trippet, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 559, 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (proposing as a test to determine if an act of
marijuana transportation is permissible "whether the quantity transported and the
method, timing and distance of the transportation are reasonably related to the pa-
tient's current medical needs").
139. While the Supreme Court has cut back on Fourth Amendment protections
over the past twenty years, it has left intact the highest level of protection in a per-
son's home. For example, the Court has held that police may arrest a suspected felon
without a warrant when the arrest is made in public. See United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 421-24 (1976). It has also held that an arrest in the home must be accompa-
nied by an arrest warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 589-90, 602-03
(1980). If the police arrest attempt is in a third party's home, a search warrant is re-
quired. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220-22 (1981). Even in cases
involving the hot pursuit of an offender, the Court has limited the police power to
enter a home without a warrant for relatively minor offenses. See Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 US. 740, 749-54 (1984). The Court has further held that even when the police are
lawfully on the premises for one purpose, they must nonetheless secure a warrant if
they seek to extend a search beyond the limits of evidence in plain view. See Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-26 (1987). Even in the area of technological information
gathering, the Supreme Court has distinguished between monitoring a suspect's ac-
tivity that takes place in public (and is, therefore, unprotected) and activity that takes
place in the home (and is, therefore, protected by the Fourth Amendment). Compare
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (holding that drivers have a di-
minished expectation of privacy, even when an electronic device is used to track a
suspect) with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1984) (holding that law




access to marijuana in a setting where detection is unlikely.
The risks inherent in the classic surreptitious marijuana
purchase from a street dealer can be easily and successfully
avoided by associates of a qualifying patient.
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act-During the Propo-
sition 215 hearings, opponents raised concerns that employers
would be required to accommodate marijuana use by employ-
ees in the workplace if its use was recommended by a
physician.140 Similar concerns have been voiced by some labor
lawyers. There is some debate about whether an employee
with an otherwise qualifying disability may claim the right to
use marijuana under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),14 but this debate is not yet in the courts.
Drug testing became common in the workplace during the
1980s, and, while on the wane in recent years, it is still an ac-
cepted practice in many employment settings.42 Before
Proposition 215, the law was settled that an employer could
discharge an employee for marijuana use, even if she were dis-
abled within the meaning of the ADA. 4 3
At first blush, the ADA seems to speak definitively to pro-
tect an employer's right to discharge an employee for illegal
drug use. Section 12114 of the ADA deals extensively with il-
legal drug use.'" Subsection 12114(a) excludes from the
protection of the Act "any employee or applicant who is cur-
rently engaging in the illegal use of drugs .... ,,145 The provision
140. See Joint Hearings, supra note 67 (statement of Stu Molirich, Consultant to
Citizens for a Drug-Free California).
141. See Marijuana Ballot In California Raises Questions Over Testing, DRUG
DETECTION REPORT, Sept. 20, 1996 (questioning whether a doctor's recommendation to
use marijuana would constitute a legitimate medical excuse for a positive drug test).
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
142. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 US. 656, 668
(1989) (finding that the need for drug testing by the United States Customs Service of
employees engaged in drug interdiction or other activities requiring them to carry
firearms outweighed the privacy interests of those employees); see also Vernonia Sch.
Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (holding that drug testing of high school
athletes was reasonable and constitutional); MILLER, supra note 126, at 74 (noting
that during the War on Drugs, the Reagan and Bush administrations shifted the em-
phasis of enforcement efforts away from large dealers and onto individual drug users
by supporting drug testing in schools and places of employment).
143. See, e.g., Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832-33 (9th Cir. 1995)
(approving employer's termination of employees who used, sold, and purchased mari-
juana on company property despite employees' claim of disability on the ground that
the discharge was based on misconduct rather than on any alleged disability).
144. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (1994).
145. See id.
SPRING 1998]
734 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
recognizes an employer's right to administer drug testing,'
4 6
and to prohibit illegal drug use in the workplace. 147
The ADA's definition of "illegal use of drugs"14 does not in-
clude the use of a drug taken under supervision by a licensed
health care professional or other uses authorized by the Con-
trolled Substances Act or other provision of federal law, but
does include the use of drugs that are unlawful to possess or
distribute under the Controlled Substances Act." 9 Marijuana
is a drug that is unlawful to possess or distribute under the
Controlled Substances Act. 5' Yet Proposition 215 has caused
uncertainty because an otherwise qualifying person who uses
marijuana may claim that she did so "under supervision by a
licensed health care professional." 5' If that is the correct
reading of the ADA, employers will have to accommodate
qualifying workers for whom a physician has recommended
marijuana.'52 However, that reading is not required by the lan-
guage of the ADA taken as a whole.
While the above reading conforms with the literal language
of the ADA, it ignores the language immediately following the
phrase "under supervision by a licensed health care
professional," which states "or other uses authorized by the
Controlled Substances Act ... ." "' Read together, the second
phrase limits the first; that is, the first phrase is limited to
instances in which the licensed health care professional has
prescribed a controlled substance as authorized by the
Controlled Substances Act. The "other uses" language suggests
that the preceding phrase, "under supervision" is a use
146. See id. § 12114(b),(d).
147. See id. § 12114(d)(2).
148. See id. § 12114(c)(1).
149. See id. § 12111(6)(A).
150. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(Schedule I)(c)(10) (1994).
151. 42 US.C. § 12111(6)(A) (1994). Even if Proposition 215 were controlling over
the ADA, many patients who qualify under Proposition 215 would remain excluded by
the ADA, because the ADA requires the medication be taken by a person who is under
the supervision of "a licensed health care professional," while section 11362.5 requires
a recommendation from a "physician." See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5
(West Supp. 1998). Were the courts to define "physician" broadly, an inordinate num-
ber of healers would be able to recommend marijuana, despite not being licensed
health care professionals. The ADA, however, does not require that the health care
professionals prescribe the medication. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6)(A) (1994). If it did,
there could be no real concern that employers would be required to accommodate em-
ployees who qualify as patients under Proposition 215, because physicians cannot
currently prescribe marijuana, which is still a Schedule I drug. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)
(Schedule I)(c)(10) (1994).
152. See 42 US.C. § 12111(9) (1994).
153. See id. § 12111(6)(A).
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authorized by the Controlled Substances Act.'" Because
marijuana remains a Schedule I drug, one with no recognized
medical use, its use is not authorized by the Controlled
Substances Act and cannot, therefore, be one properly
prescribed by a licensed health care professional.155
Senate ADA hearings have already addressed the issue of a
worker's use of marijuana.156 In written responses to Senators'
questions during those hearings, a Deputy Attorney General
addressed the problem.157 The administration argued that
those who use illegal drugs should not fall within the defini-
tion of a person with a "handicap," but then stated that the
administration did
not wish to penalize those persons who, in limited cases,
are using 'controlled substances' such as marijuana or
morphine under the supervision of medical professionals
as part of a course of treatment, including, for example,
experimental treatment or to relieve the side-effects of
chemotherapy. These persons would fall under the same
category as those who are users of legal drugs.1"
The Justice Department recognizes that the ADA may
protect some employees who use marijuana, but the Deputy
Attorney General's reference to marijuana use only applies to
the specific language in the ADA and would not extend
protection beyond the limited use of marijuana recognized by
the federal government. Therefore, under federal law at the
time of the ADA's adoption, a patient could lawfully use
marijuana if she came within the Compassionate Use
Program. According to the Deputy Attorney General, medical
marijuana use would be within the meaning of the term
"illegal use of drugs"'59 unless it was prescribed as part of the
Compassionate Use Program, because only then would it be a




155. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1994).
156. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S.933 Before the
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st
Cong. 828 (1989) (written responses of John P. Mackey, Dep. Asst. Att'y Gen.).
157. See id.
158. Id. at 837-38.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (1990).
160. COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 101ST CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ON THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AcT 8 (Comm. Print 1990) (defining the illegal use of
drugs as not including "the use of controlled substances, including the use of experi-
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Given the strong anti-drug protections reflected in other
provisions of the ADA, 161 the timing of its enactment (at the
height of the Bush administration's War on Drugs), and the
subsequent suspension of the Compassionate Use Program,' 62
a reading extending protection to employees who use illegal
drugs for medical reasons would pervert congressional intent.
This competing interpretation of the ADA, however, is plausible.
While complex interpretive problems like the effect of
Proposition 215 on the ADA can always arise with new legisla-
tion, the initiative process exacerbates the problem, because
recourse to the initiative process decreases the likelihood of
the involvement of professional legislative drafters.'63 Even
when groups affected by an initiative do testify in hearings on
an initiative, the initiative process allows the drafter to ignore
otherwise sound input. Short of proposing a counter-
proposition, individuals and groups who can demonstrate a
proposition's inadequacies have only one remedy available to
them--opposing the proposition. Yet opposing the proposition
may be inappropriate. A group may share the goals of the
proposition but object to its lack of clarity or to its inadequate
handling of some legal issues. In contrast to the normal legis-
lative process, the initiative process is more likely to force
simplistic choices between adoption and rejection of the propo-
sition. The public is not well served by this process for a
number of reasons, including the fact that we all bear the cost
of legal uncertainty.
3. Sources of Medical Marijuana-The status of marijuana
suppliers is perhaps the most important issue left unresolved
by Proposition 215. The Act gives primary caregivers,
physicians, and patients immunity from prosecution.
mental drugs, taken under the supervision of a licensed health care professional. It
also does not include uses authorized by the Controlled Substances Act or other provi-
sions of federal law.").
161. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (1990) ("For purposes of this subchapter, the
term 'qualified individual with a disability' shall not include any employee or appli-
cant who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity
acts on the basis of such use."); 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c) (1990) ("A covered entity-(1) may
prohibit the illegal use of drugs and the use of alcohol at the workplace by all employ-
ees; (2) may require that employees shall not be under the influence of alcohol or be
engaging in the illegal use of drugs at the workplace....").
162. Lester Grinspoon & James Bakalar, Marijuana as Medicine: A Plea for Re-
consideration, 23 JAMA 1875 (1995) (announcing the Public Health Service's
suspension of the Compassionate Use Program "because it undercut the [Bush] ad-
ministration's opposition to the use of illegal drugs").
163. See Kelso, supra note 3, at 339-40.
164. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1998).
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Subsection (b)(1)(c) encourages the federal and state
governments "to implement a plan to provide for the safe and
affordable distribution of marijuana."" Thus, the statute does
mention suppliers, at least implicitly.'"
Since the passage of Proposition 215, cannabis clubs have
proliferated. 167 In fact, Dennis Peron, proprietor of the Canna-
bis Cultivators Club, has boldly announced his efforts to
contract with marijuana growers throughout California.'
Elsewhere, anecdotal reports circulate that growers are trying
to secure statutory protection for their crops.' 9 A serious legal
question exists as to whether statutory immunity extends to
clubs and growers.
As mentioned above, a cannabis club may be able to qualify
as a primary caregiver, but only if that term is loosely
interpreted. 70 No plausible argument could be made that a
supplier is a primary caregiver without a much closer
association between the patient and the marijuana supplier.
Both patient and supplier, however, may attempt to claim a
defense of necessity. Since the 1970s, a number of defendants
charged with possession of marijuana have attempted to
raise a defense of medical necessity.171 That defense has
165. Id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(C).
166. See id.
167. See John Hendren, State's Pot Clubs Still rewed by Many as Outlaws,
CONTRA COSTA TIMES, June 7, 1997, at D1 (noting that at least a dozen clubs have
opened in California since voters approved Proposition 215); Alan Hess, The Innova-
tions that Will Shape the Way We Live, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 23, 1997, at 1P
(speculating that pot clubs in California will someday become franchised businesses).
168. See Eric Brazil, Pot Farming Ready To Bloom, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 22, 1996,
at Al (quoting Dennis Peron: "We've already signed contracts with a consortium of
growers .... We've got 250 people signed up who have assigned [medicinal mari-
juana] caregiver status to these professional growers."); Pot Club Signs Up Growers
But Law Officers Vow 7o Prosecute, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 4, 1997, at A4 (reporting
that Dennis Peron, in hopes of ensuring a steady supply of marijuana for his Cannabis
Cultivators Club, signed contracts with Mendocino and Humboldt County growers
that he believed legally protected the growers as third-party caregivers).
169. See Martha Irvine, Marijuana Grower Goes Public: He and Others Say Medi-
cal Pot Law Will Legitimize North State Crop, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 28, 1997, at B5
(telling the story of one Trinity County marijuana grower who announced to the
county supervisors his plan to grow one acre of the drug for medicinal purposes).
170. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
171. See, e.g., Jenks v. State, 582 So. 2d 676, 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(recognizing medical necessity as a defense to charges for possession of marijuana
where the defendant was using the drug to combat the symptoms of AIDS); State v.
Bachman, 595 P.2d 287, 288 (Haw. 1979) (holding a medical necessity defense is en-
tirely possible under the right circumstances, but that the defendant in this case did
not prove that it was medically necessary to possess marijuana); State v. Cole, 874
P.2d 878, 880-81, 883 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding the medical necessity defense
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produced mixed results.
172
Necessity is a form of justification.1 3 The elements of a ne-
cessity defense vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 7 '
Typically, a defendant must establish several elements: (1) the
harm sought to be avoided must be greater than the harm
caused by the defendant's conduct; (2) the danger, with which
the defendant is faced must be "clear and imminent"; (3) the
action chosen must be one that will abate the harm; (4) there
must be no legal alternative that would allow the defendant to
avoid the harm; and (5) the defendant must be without fault in
creating the necessity.175 One final requirement is critical to a
successful necessity defense: a showing that the defense is
consistent with legislative intent. 17 Underlying the defense is
the idea that a legislature cannot anticipate all possible cir-
cumstances and that, in cases in which the elements of
necessity are satisfied, the legislature would not intend to
criminalize the defendant's conduct. Evidence of an intent to
criminalize necessarily defeats the defense.'77
Whether the defense to a criminal charge stemming from
the use of medical marijuana is classified as a justification or
was applicable because the defendant had seen five doctors for his back pain and had
tried the other medications prescribed for him, which caused "constipation, dizziness,
nausea, disorientation, constant sleeping, and inability to drive," while marijuana was
the only medication available without these side effects); State v. Diana, 604 P.2d
1312, 1316-17 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (citing the elements of the traditional necessity
defense that are applicable when using the medical necessity defense for possession of
marijuana charges).
172. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
173. Professor Joshua Dressler has observed that necessity is a "residual justifica-
tion defense," "a defense of the last resort ... which does not fall within any other
recognized justification defense." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
262 (2d ed. 1995). The theory of the necessity defense is that even though the defen-
dant's conduct comes within the literal language of the relevant criminal statute, no
crime has been committed, since the defendant has chosen between two harms, and
by choosing correctly, he has avoided the greater social harm. In other words, the de-
fendant has made the "right" choice. See Martin R. Gardner, The Defense of Necessity
and the Right to Escape from Prison-A Step Towards Incarceration Free from Sexual
Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 110, 120 (1975). A successful necessity defense essentially
negates the actus reus of the crime charged. See Michelle R. Conde, Comment, Neces-
sity Defined: A New Role in the Criminal Defense System, 29 UCLA L. REV. 409, 413
(1981).
174. See DRESSLER, supra note 173, at 262.
175. See id. at 263-65.
176. See id. at 264; see also United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196-97 (9th Cir.
1991) (explaining that the necessity defense essentially allows the court to make the
choice the legislature would make when confronting the same situation).
177. See United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 701 (8th Cir. 1972) (noting that a
tentative draft of the Model Penal Code specifically limits the necessity defense to
justifications that the legislature did not plainly intend to exclude).
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as an excuse matters to a third party who aids another, since
many courts have blurred the line between the necessity de-
fense and the duress excuse.178 In cases of both justification
and excuse, the defendant's act causes social harm, but in the
latter case society understands (excuses) the defendant because
of the mental illness or compulsion under which he acted.7 9 If a
defense is merely an excuse, it typically does not justify the
third person's conduct."8 For example, a sane getaway driver
who helps an insane actor commit a bank robbery is not entitled
to a defense of excuse based on the insane actor's insanity.18' But
if the primary actor has a justification for her conduct, that de-
fense also justifies the third person's conduct.8 '
Proponents of the medical use of marijuana will almost cer-
tainly attempt to characterize the distribution of marijuana as
a justified act rather than an excused act. For example, wit-
nesses in support of Proposition 215 have already argued that
marijuana is superior to any other available drugs for treating
serious illnesses and for relieving severe pain. 83 In Hawaii, the
defense has already been raised as a justification."
Without a provision like Proposition 215, the availability of
a medical necessity defense for a patient seeking to use
marijuana is complicated. For example, some courts have
found necessity to be unavailable because the harm involved
was not sufficiently imminent or the patient created the
harm." Perhaps most importantly, the necessity defense may
178. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980); WAYNE R. LAFAVE
& AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4, at 628 (1986). Duress is an
excuse because it negates the mens rea element of a criminal offense, as the actor
lacks the culpability required for punishment. See State v. Turner, 711 P.2d 353, 355-
56 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985); Gardner, supra note 173, at 116.
179. See Gardner, supra note 173, at 116.
180. See Conde, supra note 173, at 415 (observing that an excused criminal act
remains unlawful and that any third party participating in the unlawful act is guilty
of a crime unless he too is individually excused).
181. See United States v. Lopez, 662 F. Supp. 1083, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(discussing this hypothetical).
182. See Conde, supra note 173, at 414 ("If the criminal act is justified, it is not
wrongful, and the victim or any third party has no right to resist."); Robin Isenberg,
Note, Medical Necessity as a Defense to Criminal Liability: United States v. Randall,
46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 273, 275 (1978) ("Justification ... is a theory of extraordinary
relief applied where the unlawful act itself was so commendable as to be inherently
non-criminal.").
183. See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 67 (recording the testimony of Arnold
Leff, who stated that smoked marijuana was more effective in-combating nausea in
cancer patients and was safer than the drug's legal counterpart, Marinol).
184. See State v. Bachman, 595 P.2d 287, 288 (Haw. 1979).
185. See id. at 288 (determining that relief from simple discomfort did not meet
the imminency and seriousness requirements); see also United States v. Moore, 486
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be inapplicable if an alternative legal drug is available.'"
Alternative drugs are available for many illnesses. 18  At least
one court has found, as a matter of law, that the harm caused
by drug use (eroding the war on drugs) outweighs the benefit
desired by a defendant: the avoidance of pain.'"
Some courts have rejected the defense when presented with
evidence of a contrary legislative intent.s 9 Many jurisdictions,
including the federal government, have classified marijuana as
a Schedule I drug, meaning it has no authorized medical use.1"
This characterization has been viewed as evidence of legisla-
tive intent to disallow the defense of medical necessity in cases
F.2d 1139, 1150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (determining that heroin addiction was the result
of defendant's own free will and that he was therefore not entitled to the defense);
Frasher v. State, 260 A.2d 656, 662 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (emphasizing that the
defendant could not claim the necessity defense when caught with drug paraphernalia
because he could have avoided the situation by taking precautions). But see Jenks v.
State, 582 So. 2d 676, 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing the medical necessity
defense because "the [defendants] obviously did not intend to contract AIDS" by re-
ceiving the virus from a contaminated blood transfusion).
186. See State v. Belcher, 706 P.2d 392, 394 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (illustrating that
the necessity defense was unavailable to a defendant possessing marijuana taken
from a "wash," a dry stream-bed, to keep it away from children, because the defendant
"had a number of other options available to him, most notably, an anonymous phone
call to the police"); State v. Piland, 293 S.E.2d 278, 280 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982)
(acknowledging that a doctor could not use the necessity defense for growing mari-
juana because there was one doctor in the state who was allowed to prescribe the drug
legally). But see State v. Cole, 874 P.2d 878, 880 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
187. See LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FORBIDDEN
MEDICINE 253 (1993) (listing anti-emetic drugs, like Zofran and Compazine, which
provide relief from the side-effects of chemotherapy); see also Geoffrey Cowley, Can
Marijuana Be Medicine?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 3, 1997, at 23 (explaining that the most
promising treatment for glaucoma is Xalatan, a once-a-day eye drop, which is virtually
free of side effects).
188. See Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d 741, 745 (Mass. 1991) (discussing
the possible negative societal impact which would result were the Defendant permit-
ted to use marijuana to alleviate his medical symptoms). But see United States v.
Randall, Crim. No. 65923-75, reprinted in 104 DAiLY WASH. L. REP. 2249, 2252-53
(D.C. Super. Ct. 1976) (holding that defendant's right to relieve the symptoms and to
deter the progression of glaucoma through marijuana use outweighed government
interests).
189. See Spillers v. State, 245 S.E.2d 54, 55 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (explaining that
because "there are no affirmative defenses as to possession or dissemination of mari-
juana for medical, health and therapeutical purposes," to rule that the defendant had
an affirmative defense would "be a judicial usurpation of a legislative prerogative");
see also State v. Tate, 505 A.2d 941, 944 (N.J. 1986) (asserting that the classification of
marijuana as a Schedule I drug was specific evidence that medical use of marijuana
was contemplated and rejected).
190. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(Schedule I)(c)(10) (1994); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11054(d)(13)(West 1985); FLA. STAT. ch. 893.03(1)(c)(7) (1997).
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involving medical marijuana.'9 ' Within California, adoption of
Proposition 215 should preempt the need to rely on the resid-
ual defense of necessity. Proposition 215 provides an express
defense against a charge of possession of marijuana, at least
where reasonable amounts of marijuana are involved, for per-
sonal and medical use.
192
The more intriguing question is whether a grower or sup-
plier, like a cannabis club, may interpose a necessity defense to
a marijuana sale or distribution charge brought by the state.'93
Proposition 215 exhorts the state and federal governments to
guarantee an adequate supply of marijuana for medical use."
However, the statute cannot bind the federal government,'95
and were the state to provide the guaranteed marijuana, it
would violate federal law. Proposition 215 simply does not ex-
plain how a qualifying patient can secure marijuana.
If a supplier is charged with the sale of marijuana, the sup-
plier almost certainly will attempt to utilize a necessity
defense. Because necessity is a residual defense, the fact that
it is not mentioned in the statute is irrelevant.' 96 Thus, the
191. See Spillers, 245 S.E.2d at 55. But see Jenks v. State, 582 So. 2d 676, 679-80
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (illustrating that in the Schedule I classification, a subsec-
tion indicates that there are limited uses for marijuana); Tate, 505 A.2d at 957.
192. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West Supp. 1998).
193. State law cannot create a defense to a federal law violation. See infra note
195 and accompanying text. Sellers and growers of very large quantities of marijuana
may still be of interest to federal prosecutors. See Brazil, supra note 128, at A8; see
also Emelyn Cruz Lat & Jim Herron Zamora, Hallinan Knocks Feds Over Pot Raid:
DA Offers to Testify for Defense if U.S. Prosecutes, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 22, 1997, at Al
(maintaining that the federal government "normally defers to local prosecutors in Bay
Area cases involving less [marijuana] than 2 tons").
194. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(c) (West Supp. 1998).
195. See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 406-07 (1871) (finding federal
authority superior to state authority because the potential for disrupting the govern-
ment was too extreme and because, under the Supremacy Clause, "[w]henever... any
conflict arises between the enactments of the two sovereignties, or in the enforcement
of their asserted authorities, those of the National government must have supremacy
until the validity of the different enactments and authorities can be finally deter-
mined by the tribunals of the United States"). See generally Michael Vitiello, The
Power of State Legislatures to Subpoena Federal Officials, 58 TUL. L. REV. 548, 556-58
(1983) (discussing the Supremacy Clause argument in Tarble).
196. See DRESSLER, supra note 173, at 262. But see People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr.
2d 559, 570 (1997). In Trippet, the First Appellate District of the California Court of
Appeals held that, because section 11362.5 identifies a defense only to section 11357
(dealing with possession) and to section 11358 (dealing with cultivation), Proposition
215 did not create a defense to the crime of transportation of marijuana. The court
reasoned: "We may not infer exceptions to our criminal laws when legislation spells
out the chosen exceptions with such precision and specificity." Id. The Trippet court
failed to recognize, however, that if legislation creates a defense, there is no need to
resort to the residual defense of necessity. Ironically, the court of appeals effectively
recognized its failure by remanding the case and recognizing that the defendant could
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California courts must resolve a number of legal questions.
Whether growers and sellers should be afforded the necessity
defense is far from clear. Three issues pose especially difficult
legal questions.
First, a court must conduct a balancing test, weighing the
harm the state wishes to avoid against the harm likely to be
caused by the defendant's conduct." Weighing and balancing
intangibles is notoriously imprecise,'98 and identifying the
relevant harm is also subject to manipulation.'" For example,
one court found that the harm suffered by a patient with pro-
gressive systemic sclerosis 2°° was outweighed as a matter of
law by the potential harm to the government's War on
Drugs.2 1 Enabling suppliers to avoid imprisonment on distri-
bution charges would encourage additional suppliers to enter
the market. Further, the necessity defense limits the govern-
ment's ability to control who has access to marijuana. Finally,
marijuana use may be harmful in itself. For some seriously ill
patients, the harm may seem slight, but smoking marijuana
involves real health risks.2°
defend by arguing that "the method, timing and distance of the transportation are
reasonably related to the patient's current medical needs." Id. at 571.
197. See DRESSLER, supra note 173, at 264; Laura J. Schulkind, Note, Applying the
Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience Cases, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 82 (1989) ("The
necessity defense involves a balancing test to determine whether a criminal act was
committed to avoid a greater harm.").
198. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 178, § 5.4, at 636-37 (explaining that a per-
son with unusual values will usually lose because the court, which conducts the
balancing test, would most likely favor traditional values).
199. See id. at 637 n.50 (stating that although "tihere was no suggestion ... that
in shipwreck cases women and children should be assigned a higher value than men-
and indeed it would be hard to prove that there is a greater intrinsic value in the life
of a woman over that of a man," the suggestion has been made that the law should
favor women and children over men).
200. See DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1495 (28th ed. 1994)
(defining "systemic scleroderma" as "a systemic disorder of the connective tissue char-
acterized by induration and thickening of the skin, by abnormalities involving both
the microvasculature ... and larger vessels .... and by fibrotic degenerative changes
in various body organs, including the heart, lungs, kidneys, and gastrointestinal
tract"); see also id. at 1360 (defining "progressive" as "increasing in scope or severity").
201. See Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d, 741, 745 (Mass. 1991).
202. See Gabriel G. Nahas, M.D. & Nicholas A. Pace, M.D., Letter to the Editor,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1993, at 20 (listing side effects of marijuana as: impaired memory
and motor skills, emphysema-like symptoms, lung, throat, and mouth cancer, and
increased incidence of schizophrenia); Sandra Blakeslee, Research-Study: Pot
"Gateway" to Other Drugs, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 27, 1997, at 3A, available in
1997 WL 11423942 (noting that findings published in the journal Science suggest that
"chronic marijuana use may literally prime the brain for other drugs of abuse, a no-
tion known as 'the gateway effect'"). Whether marijuana is a gateway drug remains
controversial. See, e.g., Bailey Just Repeats the Myths on Marijuana, BOSTON GLOBE
(North Weekly), Oct. 5, 1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 6272836.
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Balanced against these harms are widely-proclaimed
health benefits which vary among illnesses."' 3 For example,
glaucoma sufferers get benefits from marijuana even though
those benefits are limited. Marijuana is most promising in
only a limited number of situations where, for example, nau-
sea prevents ingestion of other medicines. Marinol, the
prescription version of THC, has marijuana's active ingredi-
ent, but it causes undesirable side effects such as nausea.
The prescription of choice in those cases would be marijuana.
Even with identified benefits, the courts face the difficult
task of balancing between uncertain benefits and uncertain
harms.
A second difficulty is determining whether the legislature
intended a necessity defense.2 ' Courts might find that the
statute implicitly provides that the state or federal govern-
ment is the lawful source of marijuana. In other words, the
obvious expectation, or at least, hope, of subsection
11362.5(b)(1)(C)... is that the state and federal government
will rejuvenate the now largely defunct Compassionate Use
Program.s"e Such a hope is doubtful." 7
203. See STATEMENT BY AMERICAN CANCER ASSOCIATION, CALIFORNIA DWISION, IN
RE: PROP. 215 (stating that there is strong evidence that inhaling marijuana controls
nausea and increases the appetite in chemotherapy patients); see also American
Academy of Ophthalmology, The Use of Marijuana in the Treatment of Glaucoma (last
modified Nov. 24, 1997) <http://www.eyenet.org/public/glaucoma/gl-maryj.html> [here-
inafter American Academy of Ophthalmology] (noting that marijuana can lower in-
traocular pressure, which relieves stress on the optic nerve in glaucoma patients);
GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 187, at 82 (observing that marijuana appears to
reduce muscle spasms, relieve depression, and reduce sleeplessness for patients with
involuntary muscle spasms); John Bourdrea, Marijuana for Pain?, CHI. TRIB., May 2,
1996, at 7 (reporting that marijuana stimulates appetite and helps to control nausea
and pain in AIDS patients with "wasting syndrome," which is characterized by the
loss of muscle mass and a gaunt appearance).
204. See Kelso, supra note 3, at 344-45 (noting that determining voter intent is of-
ten more difficult than determining legislative intent). With legislatively enacted
statutes, one can always turn to the legislative history, including committee reports,
staff reports, and the like to determine legislative intent. With initiatives, a tempting
source for determining voter intent is the ballot pamphlet. The arguments found in
pamphlets, however, are drafted by interested parties who are typically biased in their
interpretation of the statute. Additionally, it is questionable whether voters actually
read the ballot arguments presented in the pamphlets. See id.
205. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1998).
206. See John Bowersox, PHS Cancels Availability of Medicinal Marijuana, 84 J.
NAT'L. CANCER INST. 475 (noting that following a lengthy policy review, Public Health
Service decided to bring an end to the federal compassionate-use investigational new
drug program which for over 10 years had provided selected patients with a legal
supply of marijuana).
207. See People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 32 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (Kline, J., concurring).
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The Act is exhortatory and cannot compel state or federal
governments to act.20° Absent governmental action, the pur-
pose of the statute would be frustrated without another supply
of marijuana implicitly recognized by the Act. Since Proposi-
tion 215's enactment, neither the state or federal government
has made marijuana lawfully available. 9 Therefore, were the
statute read to intend that the only lawful supply of marijuana
would come from state or federal government, seriously ill pa-
tients would be unable to find a safe and reliable source of
marijuana.21 ° Voters could not have intended to guarantee
qualifying patients a defense to possession of marijuana while
simultaneously denying them lawful access to it.
21'
This issue also concerns growers and suppliers. Subsection
11362.5(d) of the Act implicitly recognizes a source of mari-
juana. "Section 11358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana,
shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver,
who ... cultivates marijuana .... 212 The statute implies that
patients and caregivers can grow marijuana for medical use,
but where will they get the marijuana seeds?
21
1
This may create a dilemma for the patient or caregiver un-
able to cultivate marijuana. Although marijuana is
notoriously easy to grow,24 not everyone is blessed with a
208. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1998)
(encouraging "the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for
the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of
marijuana").
209. See Scott Hadly, Activists Propose Cannabis Club to Get Pot to the Ill: Laws:
Passage of Prop. 215 Has Created a Gray Area of Jurisprudence and Forced Some Lo-
cal Residents to Obtain the Plant Through Channels Other Than Their Doctor, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, at 1B (noting that although the passage of Proposition 215 ap-
pears to be helpful for seriously ill patients in need of the drug, it has left them no
recourse but to turn to the illegal drug market to purchase their supply).
210. See People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (citing the
statutory construction maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means that
if a statute specifies exemptions, courts cannot imply additional exemptions absent
clear, contrary legislative intent).
211. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 1998); cf.
Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 570-71 (discussing the fact that Proposition 215 did not
mention any exemption from prosecution for the violation of § 11360, which prohibits
the transportation of marijuana). The court noted, however, that "practical realities
dictate that there be some leeway in applying section 11360 in cases where a Proposi-
tion 215 defense is asserted to companion charges." Id.
212. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West 1998).
213. See People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 32 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (Kline, J., concurring).
214. See Maria Alicia Guara, Growing Pot, and Proud of It: Santa Cruz Nonprofit
Group Helps the Sick, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 30, 1996, at Al (quoting a Santa Cruz, Cali-
fornia resident as saying, "[miarijuana is really easy to grow").
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green thumb."5 Subsection 11362.5(b)(1)(B) provides that pa-
tients and primary caregivers "who obtain and use marijuana
for medical purposes"216 are immune from prosecution for pos-
session. That language implicitly recognizes that those within
the statute's protection must obtain their marijuana from
someone.
Because voters were aware of the events leading up to
Proposition 215's enactment, one might argue that they were
aware that its primary purpose was to supply marijuana to
seriously ill patients. 17 Attorney General Lungren's untimely
raid on Peron's Cannabis Buyers Club months before the 1996
election218 and Peron's subsequent arrest 219 guaranteed head-
lines that not only created a martyr for Proposition 215's cause
but also created voter awareness that Proposition 215 regu-
lated both the supply and use of marijuana.2 0 Voter awareness
bolsters the argument that the initiative intended to offer
marijuana suppliers immunity.
A third issue is whether the patient has a lawful alterna-
tive. Typically, a defendant may not violate the law if she has a
lawful alternative. Courts have refused to recognize the
215. Dennis Peron admits that not everyone is successful at growing marijuana.
In a recent interview, Mr. Peron stated, "I know half my [clients] couldn't even grow
nothing [sic]. I knew that someday I would have to grow for them so I put in there for
a caregiver and that is what I am." Peron Interview, supra note 36, at 6.
216. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1997).
217. California voters were made aware of Peron's efforts to distribute marijuana
long before the 1996 election. See Cynthia Hubert McClatchy News Service, Member-
ship in this Club is Criminal, Provides Marijuana to Chronically Ill, FRESNO BEE,
Sept. 4, 1994, at B10 (noting that Peron started the Cannabis Buyers Club in 1991 in
response to the death of his lover from AIDS); see also Pot Club Founder is Ready for
Fight, Indictments: Peron Affirms Distribution of Marijuana is for Medicinal Purposes,
LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Oct. 13, 1996, at D3 (connecting Peron with the Can-
nabis Buyers Club and noting his recent arrest for distributing marijuana).
218. See Mark Evans, State Shuts Down Cannabis Buyers' Club in S.F Raid: Out-
spoken Group Accused of Selling Drug to People Who Were Not Using It for Medical
Reasons, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Aug. 5, 1996, at A3 (outlining the events
surrounding the August raid).
219. See Larry D. Hatfield & Eric Brazil, S.F Pot Club Leader Held on Drug
Charges: Surprise Bust by State Agents, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 11, 1996, at Al (noting
that the Attorney General had Peron and others arrested for possession, transporta-
tion, and maintenance of a place to furnish marijuana).
220. Newspapers across the state chronicled the events surrounding Peron's club
and the raids undertaken by the state. See e.g., Pot Club Founder to Fight Indictment;
Says Lungren Acted on Politics, Not Law, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 13, 1996, at A3; see
also Leader of Medical Marijuana Initiative Says Arrests Will Backfire, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Oct. 13, 1996, at A4.
221. See DRESSLER, supra note 173, at 263-65.
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medical necessity defense to possession of marijuana if other
lawful drugs are available.22
As previously mentioned, glaucoma patients benefit from
smoking marijuana. Glaucoma cases are often cited by advo-
cates to support marijuana's medicinal utility.22' However, the
literature suggests that glaucoma patients have other alterna-
tives.
Treatment for glaucoma requires reduction of intraocular
pressure to prevent damage to the optic nerve.225 Some drugs
typically employed to reduce intraocular pressure have serious
side effects and some types of corrective surgery have high
failure rates.'2 However, the most recently available medica-
tion, Xalatan, is virtually free of side effects,' and laser
surgery has shown greater promise than conventional sur-
gery.22 As to marijuana, it reduces eye pressure,229 but it is not
the best alternative. Marijuana may reduce the blood flow to
the optic nerve and increase the risk of blindness.o The dos-
age necessary to provide benefits is very high. As one expert
observed, for a glaucoma patient to receive significant benefits
from smoking marijuana, "[he'd] have to be stoned all the
222. See, e.g., United States v. Burton, 894 F.2d 188, 191 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the defendant could not use the medical necessity defense for his conviction for
possession of marijuana since a government program for medical marijuana use had
been established and the defendant had failed to utilize that lawful alternative); State
v. Piland, 293 S.E.2d 278, 280 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (ruling that a doctor could not grow
marijuana for a patient in need of the drug because there was already at least one
other doctor in the state who was legally allowed to prescribe the drug).
223. See generally American Academy of Ophthalmology, supra note 203.
224. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET 1996, ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF
PROPOSITION 215 ("University doctors and researchers have found that marijuana is
also effective in lowering internal eye pressure associated with glaucoma, slowing
onset of blindness.").
225. See American Academy of Ophthalmology, supra note 203.
226. For example, some of the available eye drops have serious side effects. The
beta-blocker drops cause depression, aggravate asthma, and increase the risk of heart
failure. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 187, at 40-41. The miotic drops work
by constricting the pupil, but they can blur vision and cause cataracts. See id.
227. See Cowley, supra note 186, at 23.
228. See Drug Enforcement Agency, In re Marijuana Rescheduling Petition,
Docket No. 86-22, Opinion, Recommended Ruling, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Decision of Administrative Law Judge, Sept. 6, 1988, at 35 (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Marijuana Rescheduling
Petition].
229. See Kevin B. Zeese, Esq., Research Findings on Medicinal Properties of
Marijuana (visited May 19, 1998) <http'J/www.ndsn.org/JAN97/ZEESEMM.html>.
230. See Cowley, supra note 186, at 23 (noting that such a decrease in blood sup-
ply is the last thing a glaucoma sufferer needs).
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time.""'1 Moreover, smoking sufficient quantities to bring relief
often leaves patients with chronic bronchitis.2 2
Were a court to apply the traditional elements of the neces-
sity defense to a case involving marijuana use by a glaucoma
patient, and by extension, to a case involving her supplier, the
defense would fail because the patient has lawful alternative
treatments.233 However, under Proposition 215, if a qualifying
patient is charged with possession of marijuana, the law would
explicitly immunize that person.2 M
Presumably, a supplier would not lose a necessity defense
because of the availability of legal alternatives. In effect, the
Act makes marijuana a legal alternative for the qualifying pa-
tient, and, if the other elements of a necessity defense are met,
the defense would extend to a supplier.
The foregoing discussion does not purport to exhaust the le-
gal issues posed by the Act. 5 It does demonstrate, however,
that Proposition 215 is poorly drafted, leaving numerous ques-
tions unanswered. Clear drafting helps preserve the distinct
roles of courts and legislatures, 6 but in this instance, courts
will be forced to interpret the law's meaning without any clear
guidance from either the legislature or the voters regarding
the intent and scope of the law.
This problem is exaggerated by the initiative process. The
drafters were not required to subject Proposition 215 to the
normal checks found in the legislative process. 237 Had
Proposition 215 gone through the normal legislative process,
many of the issues already discussed might have been
resolved.
Full discussion of the issues surrounding legalized medical
use of marijuana was particularly important because the
231. Id.
232. See Killer Weed Drug Hardly as Benign as its Advocates Suggest, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Dec. 19, 1996, at B14 (noting that smokers of 3-4 joints a day suffer
from chronic bronchitis as often as cigarette smokers who smoke a pack or more a
day).
233. See DRESSLER, supra note 173, at 263-64.
234. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1998).
235. See generally, People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 562, 566-67, 570-71
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (discussing issues not explicitly addressed by Proposition 215,
including transportation of marijuana and the act's retroactive effects).
236. See Kelso, supra note 3, at 339 (noting that statutes are drafted with due
deference to the roles the executive and judicial branches will play in implementing
the expressed policy of the law). This assumes that we take seriously the role of leg-
islatures to declare the law and that of the courts to interpret the law. Poorly drafted
legislation forces courts to create law to fill gaps.
237. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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poorly drafted legislation may have actually affected the de
facto legalization of marijuana itself. Many voters who proba-
bly thought they were endorsing the compassionate use of
marijuana for seriously ill patients~s would be stunned to re-
alize they had voted to enact an open-ended statute that
invites abuse.
II. ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE: WHY WAS THE INITIATIVE
PROCESS THE ONLY PROCESS AVAILABLE?
Despite all of the problems posed by Proposition 215, it re-
flects a reasonable concern for seriously ill patients who
benefit medically from using marijuana, even if those benefits
are fewer than the proposition's proponents advocated. This
section discusses why proponents of medical marijuana use
were forced to resort to the initiative process despite the fact
that a majority of Californians, and even Americans, favor
compassionate use.23' This section explores why the normal
legislative process did not reflect the sentiment of a majority
of the population.
A. A Short History of Federal Regulation of Marijuana
To understand the absence of a remedy, one must first
consider the history of the federal regulation of marijuana.
Concern about marijuana use in the United States is of
relatively recent origin.2 0 Worldwide, marijuana has a long
238. See CALIFORNIANS FOR COMPASSIONATE USE, BROCHURE (1996) (listing the
serious ailments marijuana would help alleviate, including AIDS wasting syndrome,
nausea from chemotherapy, muscle spasms caused by multiple sclerosis and paralysis,
arthritis pain, epileptic seizures, migraine headaches, menstrual cramps, asthma, and
insomnia).
239. A majority of Californians favor compassionate use, as evidenced by Proposi-
tion 215's passage in November 1996 by a 56% majority. See Rachel Zimmerman,
Marijuana For Pain Ruled Out; State Supreme Court Sees No Constitutional Right,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 25, 1997, at Al (citing an ABC news poll which
found that 69% of Americans support the medicinal use of marijuana).
240. In our earliest history, marijuana was widely grown for cloth and rope manu-
facturing. During the 1600s, Virginia farmers were required to grow marijuana, a
tradition followed by George Washington. Surviving records from the 1600s contain
references only to marijuana's commercial, not pharmaceutical, uses. See MILLER,
supra note 126, at 85. Even much later, in the early 1900s, there was no evidence of
public concern about marijuana despite growing public concern regarding narcotics in
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tradition of medical use.41 At least since the 1800s, physicians
in Europe and the United States have recommended mari-
juana as a treatment for migraines, as an appetite stimulant, a
muscle relaxant, a hypnotic, an analgesic, and an anti-
convulsant. 42 Marijuana was officially listed in the United
States Pharmacopoeia in 1850, and it was routinely prescribed
until the late 1930s.2 ' 3 Before the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act was
passed, physicians could prescribe 28 pharmaceutical prepara-
tions containing cannabis. 4
In 1937, Harry J. Anslinger was serving as the United
States Commissioner of Narcotics.25 He had served in the
Treasury Department where he aggressively enforced the Har-
rison Act and headed the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in the
Treasury Department.4" Anslinger's appeal to racism and hys-
teria was unabashed. 247  He and other proponents of the
general. Richard J. Bonnie. & Charles H. Whitebread II, The Forbidden Fruit and the
Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry Into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibi-
tion, 56 U. VA. L. REV. 971, 1011 (1970).
241. Marijuana's medical use is mentioned as early as 2737 B.C. in China when "it
was recommended ... for female weakness, beriberi, constipation, absent mindedness
and surgical anesthesia." REPORT ON MARIJUANA AND HEALTH, supra note 111, at 53.
Napoleon's soldiers may have re-introduced cannabis to Europe from Egypt, but it had
been used in Europe during the Middle Ages for various medical purposes, including
treatment of burns, earaches, and ulcers. See id. "A British physician serving in India
... reintroduced cannabis into Western medicine" after he reviewed the literature
documenting medical use of cannabis for 900 years in India. Id.
242. See Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 161, at 1875.
243. See Gregg A. Bilz, Comment, The Medical Use of Marijuana: The Politics of
Medicine, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 117, 118 (1992).
244. See REPORT ON MARIJUANA AND HEALTH, supra note 111, at 54. Medical use of
marijuana has always had some limitations. One source suggests that its use was on
the wane during the late nineteenth century because other synthetic drugs became
available and because marijuana could not be prepared in an injectable form and
could not be counted on for standard potency. Id. Its prohibition has more to do with
politics and racism than with its diminished pharmacological importance. See GERALD
E. ULEMAN & VICTOR G. HADDOCK, DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAW 2-99 (2d ed. 1983).
Like Congress's first effort at regulating narcotics, which was motivated by anti-
Chinese sentiment, Congress's first regulation of marijuana was motivated by the
threat of competition from cheap Mexican labor during the Great Depression. See
MILLER, supra note 126, at 98-99. A campaign against marijuana began in the
Southwest and West where competition from Mexican workers was most acute. In
addition, marijuana was also associated with the jazz subculture, which consisted
predominantly of African-Americans. See Bilz, supra note 243, at 118-19.
245. See MILLER, supra note 126, at 96.
246. See id. at 94.
247. Id. at 99. "Anslinger believed Hispanics caused a marijuana problem but
supplemented anti-Mexican agitation with tales about African-Americans. The Bu-
reau of Narcotics revealed, 'colored students at the Univ. of Minn. partying with
female students (white) smoking [marijuana] and getting their sympathy with stories
of racial persecution. Result pregnancy' Also, 'two Negroes took a girl fourteen years
old and kept her for two days in a hut under the influence of marihuana. Upon recov-
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Marijuana Tax Act argued that marijuana caused criminal and
violent behavior.248 During the brief hearings on the Act,
Anslinger stated that, "[miarihuana [was] an addictive drug
which produce[d] in its users insanity, criminality, and
death." 49
During the hearings on the Marijuana Tax Act, witnesses on
both sides recognized that marijuana's medical benefits should
be studied.20 For example, Dr. William C. Woodward, testifying
on behalf of the American Medical Association (AMA), advo-
cated study2 1 and continued medical use of marijuana.252
Woodward's testimony that the AMA had no evidence that
marijuana was a dangerous drug was greeted with hostility by
members of Congress.253
Despite agreement among marijuana's proponents and
opponents that continued study was in order, and despite a
professed intent to prevent recreational use of marijuana,
Congress created excessively burdensome requirements which
effectively eliminated prescription of marijuana by
physicians.2' Interestingly, more harmful drugs have not been
ery she was found to be suffering from syphilis'.... Anslinger basically had a fanati-
cal hatred of drugs, for whatever reasons he could find at a given moment." Id.
248. See id.; see also Bilz, supra note 243, at 119.
249. Charles Whitebread, Speech to the California Judges Association 1995 An-
nual Conference, The History of the Non-Medical Use of Drugs in the United States
(visited June 5, 1997) <http'//mojo.calyx.netl-olsen/DPF/whitebread06.html>. A sec-
ond proponent of the Marijuana Tax Act who testified at the hearings was a
pharmacologist from Temple University who claimed to have injected THC into the
brains of 300 dogs, resulting in the death of two of the animals. 'When asked by the
Congressmen, and I quote, 'Doctor, did you choose dogs for the similarity of their reac-
tions to that of humans?' the answer of the pharmacologist was, 'I wouldn't know, I am
not a dog psychologist.'" Id.
250. Proponents argued that the Act "would raise revenue from marijuana sales,
discourage illicit use of marijuana, and facilitate ... the medical use of marijuana."
Bilz, supra note 243, at 120. Opponents, on the other hand, argued that the restrictive
legislation would prevent further studies on the medical benefits of marijuana. See id.
251. See id.
252. See MILLER, supra note 126, at 99 (citing Woodward as asserting that the
movement to outlaw marijuana relied on rumor and hearsay rather than on solid
facts).
253. See Whitebread, supra note 249. One of the congressmen attending the
hearings said in response to Woodward's testimony, "Doctor, if you can't say something
good about what we are trying to do, why don't you go home?" Id. The next congress-
man to speak up reacted similarly, "Doctor, if you haven't got something better to say
than that, we are sick of hearing you." Id. Professor Whitebread explains this hostility
as being responsive to the American Medical Association's systematic opposition to all
of the New Deal legislation; the committee largely consisted of New Deal Democrats.
See id.
254. See Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 161, at 1875.
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subject to similar bureaucratic regulation.25 Nevertheless, the
Act led to the decision to drop cannabis from the United States
Pharmacopoeia. s
While the AMA might have continued to oppose federal pol-
icy, Anslinger convinced the AMA to reverse its position. Prior
to the publication of a study commissioned by New York City's
Mayor, Fiorello La Guardia, the AMA described the report as a
"careful study" of marijuana.257 Apparently, the AMA continued
to believe that marijuana might have medical uses.25 8 Almost
immediately, however, the AMA reversed itself at Anslinger's
211urging. Consequently, for over thirty years, the AMA has re-
mained clear of the political and scientific debate about
marijuana's medicinal qualities.
Looking at the Marijuana Tax Act 35 years later, the Na-
tional Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse concluded
that the Act was misguided. It found that "[tihe policy-makers
knew very little about the effects or social impact of the drug;
many of their hypotheses were speculative and, in large meas-
ure, incorrect."26'
Wholesale experimentation with marijuana during the
1960s changed the focus from potential medical use of
marijuana to legalization. 62 That debate is largely beyond the
scope of this article, 2' but a brief look at the First Report of
255. See id. (comparing the lethal dose to effective dose ratios of secobarbitol and
ethanol).
256. See Bilz, supra note 244, at 118.
257. See generally FIRST REPORT OF NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND




260. See id. On March 19, 1982, the Journal of the American Medical Association
printed a letter to the editor from U.S. Representative Newt Gingrich, which read in
part, "Federal policies do not reflect a factual or balanced assessment of marijuana's
use as a medicant. The Council, by thoroughly investigating the available materials,
might well discover that its own assessment of marijuana's therapeutic value has, in
the past, been more than slightly shaded by federal policies that are less than neu-
tral." Newt Gingrich, Letter to the Editor, Legal Status of Marijuana, 247 JAMA 1525,
1563 (Mar. 19, 1982). In response, a representative of the AMA agreed that "dis-
passionate examination" of the benefits of medical marijuana use was needed. Id.
261. SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 257, at 132.
262. See Whitebread, supra note 249 (noting that in 1969 Congress passed the
Dangerous Substances Act, which actually lowered the penalties for possession of
marijuana).
263. For a more complete treatment of that issue, see MILLER, supra note 126;
Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 240, at 1178 (offering a statutory scheme that
"permits those who choose to smoke marijuana to do so but which inhibits spread of
the conduct; that is, it simply takes the user of marijuana out of the criminal proc-
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the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, a
commission appointed by President Nixon in 1971," indicates
how dramatically attitudes about marijuana changed. For
example, it recommended that federal law be changed so that
"possession of marijuana for personal use would no longer be
an offense."2 Despite the report's assurances that "President
Nixon ha[d] frequently expressed his personal and official
commitment to providing a rational and equitable public
response to the use and misuse of drugs,"2 Nixon disavowed
the recommendations before publication and announced that
'[e]ven if the commission does recommend that [marijuana] be
legalized, I will not follow the recommendation."'28 7
President Nixon began a new war on drugs by urging the
adoption of new federal anti-drug legislation.2  In 1970, Con-
gress responded with the Comprehensive Drug Prevention and
Control Act (also known as the Controlled Substances Act).289
The Controlled Substances Act classifies marijuana as a
Schedule I drug,"' which, according to the Act, lacks an
"accepted medical use," an "accepted safety for use," and car-
ries "a high potential for abuse." "
The Act allows interested parties to petition Congress for a
hearing to demonstrate that a drug should be reclassified.272
On May 19, 1972, the National Organization for the Reform of
Marijuana Law (NORML) utilized that right and petitioned to
have marijuana removed from Schedule I, to allow no restric-
tions on its use, or alternatively to have it rescheduled as a
ess"); JOHN KAPLAN, MARIJUANA-THE NEW PROHIBITION 311-50 (1970) (discussing
alternatives to the criminalization of marijuana).
264. See Bilz, supra note 243, at 122; SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note
257, at 2-3.
265. SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 257, at 152 (stating that "[t]he
Commission recommends only the following changes in federal law: Possession of
marihuana for personal use would no longer be an offense, but marihuana possessed
in public would remain contraband subject to summary seizure and forfeiture" and
"c]asual distribution of small amounts of marihuana for no remuneration, or insig-
nificant remuneration not involving profit would no longer be an offense").
266. Id. at 3.
267. LESTER GRINSPOON, M.D., MARIHUANA RECONSIDERED 193 n.3 (2d ed. 1977).
268. See Edwin Meese III & Rhett DeHart, How Washington Subverts Your Local
Sheriff, J. AM. CITIZENSHIP POL'Y REV. 48, 50 (Jan.-Feb. 1996) (noting that the Controlled
Substances Act, a product of the Nixon administration, gave the federal government
jurisdiction over all drug crimes in the United States).
269. See Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, Title II, § 101, 84
Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994)).
270. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(Schedule I)(c)(10) (1994).
271. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A) (1994).
272. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (1994).
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Schedule V drug, which would only subject marijuana to
minimal control.273 A brief review of the history of NORMUs
legal efforts to reschedule marijuana illustrates the federal
government's continued hostility toward any modification of
federal law.
274
The Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, the Drug Enforcement Agency's (DEA) predecessor, ini-
tially refused to accept the filing of the petition. 27' The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed
that decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The DEA rejected NORMUs efforts to reschedule marijuana
twice between 1975276 and 1986.277 Each time, the circuit court
remanded the case for further proceedings. 278 Finally, in April
1986, the DEA requested that AJ Francis L. Young conduct a
hearing.
279
The hearing took two years, creating a record so vast that it
"stands nearly five feet high."2' Eventually, Judge Young rec-
ommended rescheduling marijuana from Schedule I to
273. See Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, supra note 227, at 2.
274. See, e.g., Bilz, supra note 243, at 124-30.
275. See 37 Fed. Reg. 18097 (1972).
276. Hearings were held at the DEA in January 1975. Although the judge found in
NORMLs favor on various issues, the acting administrator of the DEA denied
NORMLs position "in all respects." See Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, supra note
228, at 2.
277. The second time around, the DEA referred NORML's petition to the Secre-
tary of Health, Education, and Welfare, who subsequently recommended to the DEA
that marijuana remain a Schedule I drug. The DEA then issued a final order declining
to transfer marijuana from its Schedule I status. See 44 Fed. Reg. 36123 (1979).
278. See Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enforcement Ad-
min., 559 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, supra note
228, at 3 (quoting NORML v. DEA, No. 79-1660 (D.C. Cir., unpublished order filed Oct.
16, 1980)).
279. See generally 1-2 MARIJUANA, MEDICINE & THE LAW (R.C. Randall ed., 1988
& 1989)(compiling witness testimony, exhibits, legal briefs, oral arguments, and Judge
Young's recommendation).
280. 57 Fed. Reg. 10,499 (1992) (denying petition of NORML to reschedule mari-
juana).
During the early stages of the proceedings, NORML and co-petitioner, Alliance for
Cannabis Therapeutics (ACT), amended the petition to request that marijuana be
rescheduled from Schedule I to Schedule II. See Marijuana Rescheduling Petition,
supra note 228, at 4. While Schedule II substances have a high potential for abuse,
they also have a currently accepted medical use in treatment. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 812(b)(2)(1994). The issues addressed, therefore, were "whether marijuana has a
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, or a currently ac-
cepted medical use with severe restrictions," and "whether there is a lack of accepted
safety for use of the marijuana plant under medical supervision." Marijuana Resched-
uling Petition, supra note 228, at 7.
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Schedule I. 5l The judge held that if a respectable minority of
physicians supported the use of marijuana in treatment,2
such use would be medically acceptable. Furthermore, the judge
rejected the DEA's standard, which required the petitioner to
demonstrate the drug has eight distinct characteristics.2 ' The
DEA's position was that rescheduling marijuana was inappro-
priate,2 but the judge disagreed.285
Once again, the DEA administrator rejected the recommen-
dation to reschedule marijuana.' The court of appeals
affirmed the order of the administrator.287 The court held that
since neither the medical Controlled Substances Act nor its
legislative history defined "currently accepted medical use," it
was obligated to defer to the agency's interpretation if that in-
terpretation was reasonable.2 " The court, however, did reject
281. See Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, supra note 228, at 67. Judge Young
noted that other federal agencies, such as the FDA, would likely have to act even if
the DEA rescheduled the drug to Schedule II to make marijuana readily available.
282. See id. at 28-29.
283. The characteristics were as follows: 1) "Scientifically determined and accepted
knowledge [of the chemistry of the substance]"; 2) "toxicology and pharmacology of the
substance in animals"; 3) "[e]stablishment of its effectiveness in humans through sci-
entifically designed clinical trials"; 4) "[g]eneral availability of the substance and
information regarding the substance and its use"; 5) "[rlecognition of its clinical use in
generally accepted pharmacopeia, medical references, journals, or textbooks"; 6)
"[s]pecific indications for the treatment of recognized disorders"; 7) "[rlecognition of
the use of the substance by organizations or associations of physicians"; and 8)
"[riecognition of the substance by a substantial segment of the medical practitioners
in the United States.' 54 Fed. Reg. 53,767, at 53,783 (1989).
284. See Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, supra note 228, at 31. Judge Young
noted that the standards were inappropriate when applied to marijuana, a natural
plant substance, because they were developed to handle proceedings relating to syn-
thetic drugs. See id. He also noted that FDA regulations are designed to accommodate
pharmaceutical companies which manufacture synthetic drugs. See id. at 33-34.
285. The judge found that the respectable minority of physicians met the standard
for accepted medical use when treating cancer patients for nausea and vomiting re-
sulting from chemotherapy treatments, spasticity resulting from multiple sclerosis
and other causes, and for hyperthyroidism. He found insufficient evidence that there
was accepted medical use for treatment of glaucoma. Id. at 34, 39, 54.
286. The administrator called the standard for a respectable minority of physi-
cians "preposterous' and criticized the judge for lacking impartiality, for accepting
anecdotal evidence, for ignoring the government's evidence, and for relying on
"irresponsible and irrational statements propounded by the pro-marijuana parties.' 54
Fed. Reg. at 53,767. The administrator also accused NORML and ACT of attempting
to "perpetrate a dangerous and cruel hoax on the American public by claiming mari-
juana has currently accepted medical uses.' Id. at 53,783-84. See also Alliance for
Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 930 F.2d 936, 938-39 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (stating that the administrator of the DEA "exercised with a vengeance his pre-
rogative ... to reject the A.'s recommended decision'); 51 Fed. Reg. 22,946 (1986)
(notice of hearing).
287. See ACT v. DEA, 930 F.2d at 941.
288. See id. at 939.
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some of the factors relied on by the DEA because they would
be impossible to prove. The court remanded the case to allow
the DEA to clarify which factors it relied on in rejecting the
rescheduling petition."
Not surprisingly, in March 1992 the administrator issued
his final order denying the rescheduling petition.2'9 The order
was based on various factors.291 The administrator, however,
did eliminate those found objectionable by the court of ap-
peals.292 Twenty years of litigation left the matter where it
stood in 1972, with marijuana still characterized as a Schedule
I drug.
The NORML litigation demonstrates the DEA's intransi-
gence. As a result, parties seeking to reclassify marijuana will
be deterred from using these administrative proceedings. Not
only was the litigation protracted and expensive, but the stan-
dard adopted by the agency continues to make reclassification
through the administrative forum almost impossible.2 93 For ex-
ample, the federal government's position has made the
requirement that adequate, well-controlled studies prove the
drug's efficacy almost impossible to satisfy. 94 Currently, the only
289. Specifically, the court rejected factors (4),(5), and (8) as impossible to fulfill
due to the strict controls on Schedule I drugs. See id. at 940. The court stated that it
would be nearly impossible to show that any Schedule I drug was in general use or
generally available. See id. Further, the court added that a drug rarely prescribed
would not be listed as medically useful under any pharmaceutical category. See id.
290. See 57 Fed. Reg. 10,499 (1992).
291. The administrator emphasized the lack of any concrete scientific data estab-
lishing the effectiveness of marijuana for medical treatment. See id. at 10,502-03.
However, the DEA administrator pointed to what he termed "significant" short- and
long-term side effects and risks of marijuana use. See id. at 10,500. Additionally, the
administrator attacked reliance on anecdotal evidence, comparing such reliance to
snake oil salesmen. See id. at 10,502. The administrator stated that the doctors who
testified in favor of rescheduling relied not on any legitimate scientific studies, but on
anecdotal evidence. The DEA also noted that nearly half of the doctors who testified
on behalf of NORML were psychiatrists and did not specialize in treating the condi-
tions at issue in the hearings. See id. Further, the DEA administrator discounted
studies that were relied upon by NORML as unscientific. See id. at 10,500 (stating
that studies conducted by states in the 1970s and 1980s indicating that marijuana is
medically effective "failed to follow responsible scientific methods").
292. See id. at 10,506.
293. The currently accepted medical use standard adopted by the DEA mandates:
1) the drug's chemistry be known and reproducible; 2) that there must be adequate
safety studies; 3) that there be adequate, well-controlled studies proving efficacy; 4)
that the drug be accepted by qualified experts, meaning those with training and expe-
rience in evaluating the effectiveness of drugs; and 5) that the scientific evidence be
widely available. See id.
294. See Mark Sauer, Political Smoke Screen: Truth About Pot is Casualty in Drug
War, Researchers Say, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Jan. 12, 1997, at D1 (describing the
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lawfully grown marijuana in the United States is cultivated on
a Mississippi farm operated by the National Institute on Drug
Abuse.295 Over the past twenty years, at least ten states have
established research programs to seek FDA approval for In-
vestigational New Drug applications,29 but the programs have
been abandoned because of burdensome regulations on the
program participants.2  Studies relied on by NORML and ACT
tend to be anecdotal, similar to the kind of evidence treating
physicians are likely to rely on in making a recommendation
to a seriously ill patient.298 Those studies did not impress the
DEA and are not likely to satisfy its standards for reschedul-
ing.
During the 1970s, the FDA did institute a program entitled
Individual Treatment IND, commonly referred to as Compas-
sionate IND or the Compassionate Use Program.2" Between
1976 and 1988, the program provided free, pre-rolled mari-
juana cigarettes to about a dozen approved patients.3 ° The
program was under the control of three separate agencies, the
FDA (responsible for evaluating the medical merits of applica-
tions), the DEA (responsible for enforcing legal procedures to
secure the marijuana), and the National Institute on Drug
Abuse (responsible for the cultivation of marijuana on its Mis-
sissippi farm).3 0'
During the late 1980s, the application process was stream-
lined.3° The FDA approved a form that could be completed in
less than an hour, replacing one that took up to 50 hours to
complete. 3 As a result, in 1989, the FDA was swamped with
new applications from AIDS patients seeking to become par-
ticipants in the Compassionate Use Program. 0 ' In 1991, partly
frustrations of physicians whose research projects were blocked by the federal gov-
ernment's marijuana policy).
295. See Bilz, supra note 243, at 132.
296. See Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 162, at 1875.
297. See id.
298. See 57 Fed. Reg. 10,502-03 (1992).
299. See Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 162, at 1875.
300. See Charles Seabrook, Federal Cut Causes Problems in Medical Marijuana
Problems, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 31, 1992, at El.
301. See Bilz, supra note 243, at 132.
302. See Paul Cotton, Government Extinguishes Marijuana Access, 267 JAMA
2573, 2573 (1992).
303. See id.
304. Although the government stated that the application process took thirty
days, the ACT placed the wait at approximately six months and stated that there were
about 200 backlogged applications. See Bilz, supra note 243, at 133.
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in response to the rise in applications, the FDA suspended the
program pending review."
Apart from administrative problems, the Compassionate
Use Program posed bureaucratic problems for the FDA,3  be-
cause the program could undermine President Bush's public
opposition to illegal drugs. The head of the Public Health
Service stated that the program sent a "bad signal" and that it
invited the "perception that this stuff can't be so bad."0 7 The
government cancelled the program in March 1992.38
The Clinton administration promised to reconsider the deci-
sion to cancel the program,3° but it has not reinstated it. Eight
people who had enrolled in the program before it was canceled
are still receiving marijuana.310
By 1993, when California's legislature passed Senate Joint
Resolution 8, 37 states had petitioned the government to pass
legislation allowing physicians to prescribe marijuana for
medical uses. ll In a letter to California Representative Dan
Hamburg, the Assistant Secretary of Health, Dr. Philip Lee,
explained that the federal government could not reclassify
marijuana due to a lack of sound scientific studies relating to
medical use of marijuana.312
Apart from the limited Compassionate Use Program, the
government has opposed marijuana use for sixty years. That
position has been motivated by a variety of often inappropriate
considerations. Early drug policy was motivated by racism and
hostility towards lower socioeconomic classes.313 Even at the
305. Cf Cotton, supra note 302, at 2573 (stating that the timing of the cancella-
tion of the program was influenced by the influx of applications from AIDS patients).
306. See Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 162, at 1876.
307. Cotton, supra note 302, at 2573. The head of Public Health Service also ex-
pressed fear that 'AIDS patients, crazed on marijuana, would be more likely to
practice unsafe sex." Medical Marijuana: The Last Smoke, ECONOMIST, Mar. 28, 1992,
at 23-24.
308. See John Bowersox, PHS Cancels Availability of Medical Marijuana, 84 J.
NAT'L CANCER INST. 475 (1992). Two weeks after the cancellation of the Compassion-
ate Use Program, the DEA administrator issued his final order rejecting the petition
of NORML to transfer marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II on the basis that
marijuana has no currently accepted medical use. See Medical Marijuana, supra note
307, at 23-24.
309. See Sabin Russell, Medical Use of Marijuana Under Review, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 5, 1994, at Al.
310. See Despite Marijuana Furor, 8 Users Get Drug from the Government, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, at A33.
311. See Dennis Peron, Marijuana for Medical Use, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 19, 1997,
at 6F.
312. See White House Keeping Ban on Medical Marijuana, S.F. CHRON., July 19,
1994, at A3.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 244-47.
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height of tolerance towards marijuana use, President Nixon
began a war on drugs, rejecting his own commission's recom-
mendations that would have treated marijuana differently
from other drugs.3 " Narrow, targeted efforts to modify federal
policy to accommodate the needs of seriously ill patients have
also failed.315 At least insofar as proponents of Proposition 215
hoped to secure the right to use marijuana for medical purposes,
their conduct can be understood as a direct reaction to the con-
sistent, unyielding position of the federal government.3"'
B. California's Response to Marijuana Use
California was one of the first states to outlaw marijuana,
preceding federal efforts to regulate marijuana by over twenty
years. '7 California also led efforts to legalize medical use. 18
Despite less intransigence by state than by federal officials,
medical-use proponents were still forced to resort to the initia-
tive process. This section reviews local efforts to legalize
medical use of marijuana prior to Proposition 215.J'
314. See supra text accompanying note 267.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 299-15.
316. Some members of Congress continue to demonstrate extreme hostility to-
ward marijuana use, medicinal or otherwise. Several bills have been proposed in
Congress to limit the medicinal use of marijuana. See H.R. 1310, 105th Cong. (1997)
(amending the Controlled Substances Act to require the Attorney General to revoke
the registration of any registrant under the Act who recommends the illegal use of a
controlled substance to a patient); H.R. 1265, 105th Cong. (1997) (providing disincen-
tives to the illegal use of marijuana in states allowing the medicinal use of marijuana
by denying federal benefits to individuals convicted of certain drug offenses); S. 40,
105th Cong. (1997) (outlining federal sanctions for practitioners who administer, dis-
pense, or recommend the use of marijuana).
317. California first regulated marijuana in 1907. The state legislature classified
the drug as a "poison." Possession of marijuana remained legal until 1915, at which
point state law mandated that the drug could be possessed legally only with the pre-
scription of a physician. See Michael A. Town, Comment, The California Marijuana
Possession Statute: An Infringement on the Right of Privacy or Other Peripheral Con-
stitutional Rights?, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 758, 759 (1968). The prohibition of marijuana in
the West at the turn of the century was motivated by outright prejudice against Mexi-
can immigrants, who were thought responsible for the proliferation of marijuana
throughout the Western United States. See Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 240, at
1012.
318. See infra text accompanying notes 320-54.
319. As early as 1954, California criminal defendants were attempting to beat
charges for possession of marijuana by raising the issue of the plant's medicinal value.
See People v. Saldana, 271 P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954). The only defense
witness in the case testified that the marijuana seeds found on the defendant were
Proposition 215
By the late 1960s, Californians began a serious study of
marijuana. 20 In 1968, the California legislature established a
state research advisory panel to investigate the effects of
marijuana and hallucinogenic drugs.32' Health and Safety Code
section 11481 (formerly codified under section 11655.6) gave
the panel authority to approve and review annually research
projects on marijuana.322 In 1979, Senate Bill 184 added a re-
quirement that the Research Advisory Panel establish an
additional panel to research marijuana's medicinal uses.23
SB 184 received widespread support from mainline medical
organizations like the American Cancer Society, the Board of
Osteopathic Examiners, and Stanford's Children's Hospital
3 '
and from the print media.2 5 Published opposition was slim.
The only outspoken opponent of the bill was a representative
of the DEA, 26 who argued that marijuana had no recognized
medical use.2 7 In addition to mandating research, SB 184
actually his and that an Indian doctor had recommended the seeds to help with his
kidney trouble.
320. See S.B. 1268, 1968 Reg. Sess. (Cal.)
321. See id. The panel was to consist of representatives from the State Depart-
ment of Health, the Department of Mental Hygiene, the State Board of Pharmacy, the
Attorney General, the University of California, and a California private university. All
members were to be appointed by the heads of their respective entities. See id.
322. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11481 (West 1991). Since its inception,
the panel has existed largely in obscurity, gaining notoriety only in 1990, when the
advisory panel's annual report to the legislature recommended the decriminalization
of marijuana in California. See Maria Puente, Hushed Report: Pot Growing Should Be
Decriminalized, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 17, 1990, at iF. Then California At-
torney General John Van de Kamp blocked publication of the portion of the report
which recommended decriminalization of marijuana cultivation for personal use, cre-
ating media interest that thrust the panel and its report into the spotlight. See id.
Prior reports, including those on the medicinal uses of marijuana, were typically
printed and forgotten. See Joanne Jacobs, Drug Prohibition Just Doesn't Work; So End
It, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 20, 1990, at 5B.
323. See S.B. 184, 1979-1980 Reg. Sess. (Cal.), Assembly Office of Research, Apr. 5,
1979, at 1. At the time Senate Bill 184 was passed, Illinois, Florida, Louisiana, and
New Mexico had already enacted similar legislation allowing for the use of marijuana
as a remedy for glaucoma and cancer. See Medicinal Use of Marijuana, SAN DIEGO
UNION, Feb. 9, 1979 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
324. See S.B. 184, 1979-1980 Reg. Sess. (Cal.), Analysis of Assembly Committee on
Health, Apr. 5, 1979, at 4.
325. See, e.g., Medicinal Use of Marijuana, supra note 323; see also, Marijuana As
a Relief for Pain, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1979 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform); Marijuana by Prescription, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 13, 1979
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Marijuana Benefits?
THE UNION (Sacramento, CA), Jan. 12, 1979 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
326. See S.B. 184, 1979-1980 Reg. Sess. (Cal.), Analysis of the Senate Democratic
Caucus, Mar. 7, 1979, at 1. David Wakka of the DEA was the only opponent listed
among the numerous analyses of the bill. See id.
327. See id.
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instructed the Research Advisory Panel to establish a study
program on marijuana's utility for cancer patients. 3 8 The law
exempted program participants from prosecution for
possession and distribution of marijuana9
SB 184 included a sunset provision that would have termi-
nated the Cannabis Therapeutic Program in 1984.33 A later
bill, Senate Bill 1765, not only extended the program through
1988 but also expanded it to include patients suffering from
glaucoma.3 ' However, the program was effectively terminated
in October 1986, when the FDA approved the marketing of
Marinol.3 2 Despite FDA approval, the panel found that
smoked marijuana received comparable favorable ratings with
Marinol from patients in the program.333 Nonetheless, with the
availability of Marinol, the panel found that the physician in-
vestigators in charge of the program did not have a continuing
interest in marijuana. a
Average Californians, on the other hand, remained interested
in having available a lawful supply of marijuana. More
328. See id. (Analysis of Assembly Committee on Health) (Apr. 5, 1979). The bill
also provided for program expansion at a later date to study marijuana as a remedy
for glaucoma. See id.
329. See S.B. 184, ch. 300, § 1, 1979-1980 Reg. Sess. (Cal.) (adding section 11261 to
the California Health and Safety Code).
330. See id. ("The pilot program shall be terminated, unless extended by the Leg-
islature, four years after the date cannabis or its derivatives are first distributed to
patients under the program or December 31, 1984, whichever first occurs.").
331. See S.B. 1765, ch. 417, § 4, 1983-1984 Reg. Sess. (Cal.). "Mhe Research Advi-
sory Panel shall... (4) Establish a program of research into the use of cannabis and
its derivatives to determine its potential effectiveness in reducing intraocular pres-
sure in glaucoma patients who do not respond well to conventional medication. The
panel shall be responsible for establishing protocols, for working with the medical
community and with ophthalmologists, and taking whatever steps are necessary to
further the program." Id.
332. See California Research Advisory Panel, Cannabis Therapeutic Program, Re-
sults of Study with Smoked Marijuana, Jan. 24, 1989 (visited June 10, 1997)
<httpJ/www.druglibrary.orgschaffer/hemp/medical/ctp3.htm>. The Advisory Panel
was of the opinion that the California study was a key factor in the FDA's decision to
approve Marinol for marketing. See id.
333. The panel found the effectiveness of smoked marijuana as an anti-emetic
treatment for cancer patients to be similar to that of orally administered tetrahydro-
cannibinol (THC). See id. Effectiveness was rated very or moderately successful by
58.7% of patients. See id. Smoked marijuana did produce slightly more intense side
effects than orally administered THC, but this result was expected due to the rapid
delivery resulting from the act of smoking. See id. Side effects from both methods
were found to be significant, but never life-threatening. See id. Clinically serious ad-
verse reactions to THC or smoked marijuana were experienced in a total of only ten
patients. See id.
334. See id. (noting that interest in continuing the program declined despite the
fact that all participants had been advised that marijuana cigarettes would continue
to be available through the end of 1988).
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recently, proponents of medical marijuana have used local
politics to gain limited acceptance of medical use. For example,
in 1993, the Santa Cruz district attorney dropped marijuana
charges against a woman arrested for cultivating five marijuana
plants."3 ' Charges were dropped because the district attorney
accepted the woman's claim that her use was necessary to
treat her severe epileptic seizures.33
Santa Cruz was also one of the first of many communities to
pass a measure asking state and federal authorities to allow
marijuana to be used for medicinal purposes. In 1992, over
75% of the local electorate voted in favor of Measure A, which
supported efforts to legalize marijuana for medicinal purposes
and ordered the Santa Cruz Board of Supervisors to ask local
law enforcement officials to "adhere to the spirit of the ordi-
nance" by overlooking cases in which a person possessed
marijuana for medical use.37 Similar measures were passed
throughout northern California. 8
When it became obvious that the Clinton administration
would not break from its predecessors' position on reschedul-
ing marijuana to allow limited medical use, the California
legislature responded by passing Senate Bill 1364, which
sought to recognize marijuana as a Schedule II drug for
335. See John Enders, Woman's Pot Use Lights Up a Debate, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Sept. 23, 1993, at B1.
336. See id. Such lenience toward marijuana is almost expected in the city and
county of Santa Cruz. One resident filed a class action lawsuit against various local
and state officials on behalf of himself and others who used marijuana medicinally.
See Jane Meredith Adams, Quadriplegic Sues Over State's Marijuana Ban, SAC-
RAMENTO BEE, Sept. 17, 1994, at B5. Claiming that the state's restrictions on his use
of the drug were unconstitutional, Scott Hager asserted that his rights to safety, pri-
vacy, and happiness as well as his protection from unreasonable search and seizure
were violated when police confiscated marijuana plants from his home. See id. The
case was eventually thrown out of court by a judge who stated that this is a legislative
issue. See Pot Ban Challenge Dismissed, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 25, 1995, at B3.
337. See Wayne Wilson, High Time for Pot as Medicine-Santa Cruz Voters Cer-
tainly Think So, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 7, 1992, at B6.
338. For example, in 1991, Dennis Peron authored San Francisco's Proposition P,
which urged legalization of marijuana for medicinal use. See Dan Levy, Medicinal Use
of Marijuana Backed-S.F Board Committee Wants to Urge Legalization for Treat-
ment, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 10, 1993, at A18. Another such resolution was passed in the
northern California county of Marin. See Torri Minton, New Hype About Hemp-A
New Marijuana Mania Is Showing Up In Fashion, Environmental Debates and Medi-
cine, and It's Fueling a Bold and Burgeoning Legalization Movement, S.F. CHRON.,
May 4, 1993, at B3. The town of Fairfax, within Marin County, has a town policy
which urges "compassion ... for those who are ill in [their] community and whose
sufferings would be alleviated by the use of medical marijuana." Glen Martin, Pot
Plant Seizure Challenges Fairfax Policy-Woman With AIDS Says It's For Medicinal
Use, Police Say the Stalks Were in 'Plain View", S.F. CHRON., July 14, 1994, at A15.
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legitimate medical use." 9 Governor Wilson vetoed the bill on
September 30, 1994,340 during a heated gubernatorial race in
which his campaign strategy posed him as the toughest anti-
crime candidate in the race." Wilson's veto letter to the
Senate asserted that the bill served no purpose because it
would be preempted by federal law, because orally
administered THC was already available for prescription, and
because the bill would put physicians and pharmacists at risk
of federal prosecution if they prescribed marijuana.342
In 1995, proponents of legalizing marijuana for medical use
attempted a different approach. Unlike SB. 1364, which would
have reclassified marijuana, Assembly Bill 1529 created a de-
fense for a seriously ill person charged with possession of
marijuana.43 Such an approach would not be preempted by
federal law; AB 1529 created a defense if state authorities at-




Support for the legislation had grown since SB 1364. The of-
ficial list of supporters included nearly 30 groups and
339. See S.B. 1364, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal.), Analysis of Assembly Committee
on Health, June 28, 1994, at 1. Senate Bill 1364 followed Senate Joint Resolution 8,
which had been passed by the California Legislature only five months earlier. See S.J.
Res. 8, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal.). SJR 8 memorialized the state legislature's com-
mitment to the legalization of medical marijuana by asking President Clinton and
Congress to enact federal legislation permitting physicians to prescribe marijuana
and to ensure a safe and affordable supply of the drug for medical use. See S.J. Res. 8,
1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal.), Legislative Counsel's Digest, Mar. 3, 1993, at 1-2. SJR 8
found widespread support outside the legislature, ranging from the state's largest
medical association to various organizations who endorsed the legalization of mari-
juana for medical purposes. See S.J. Res. 8, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal.). In contrast,
published support for SB 1364 showed support from traditional marijuana reform
organizations to be conspicuously lacking. See S.B. 1364, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal.),
Analysis of Assembly Committee on Health, June 28, 1994, at 2. Rather, support for
this bill seemed to be primarily community based, with entire cities and counties of-
fering their backing of the legislation. See id.
340. See Letter from Pete Wilson of Sept. 30, 1994, supra note 34.
341. See Vitiello, supra note 5, at 1660; see also Greg Lucas, Medical Marijuana
Bill Approved, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 19, 1994, at A20.
342. See Letter from Pete Wilson of Sept. 30, 1994, supra note 34.
343. See A.B. 1529, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal.), Legislative Counsel's Digest, Feb.
24, 1995, at 1. AB 1529 provided that existing prohibitions against the possession or
cultivation of marijuana would not apply to persons possessing or cultivating the drug
for their own personal medicinal use. This exemption applied to persons who had ob-
tained approval for such use in writing from their physician. See id. at 1-2
344. See Op. Legis. Counsel No. 21915 (June 2, 1995) (cited in A.B. 1529, 1995-




individuals representing diverse viewpoints. s45 Among the list
of supporters were not only organizations like NORML, but
also California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform, the Los
Angeles District Attorney, and an American Legion post.
346
Proponents from both parties urged passage on the Assembly
floor.3 7 Like SB 1364, AB 1529 passed through both houses. 3 '
Again, Governor Wilson vetoed this bill. He stated concerns
that the bill would "for all intent [sic] and purposes legalize
possession and cultivation in California."3 9 He also expressed
concern that AB 1529 would unduly complicate law enforce-
ment's efforts and noted that "[tihe FDA concluded that
marijuana has no recognized medical use."'o
There may be sound policy reasons to resist the legalization
of medicinal marijuana, 51 but Governor Wilson did not make a
very compelling case for his second veto of legislation aimed at
making marijuana lawful for medical use. Twice, a majority of
the legislature overcame the normal fear of appearing soft on
crime to pass medical marijuana bills. They did so because a
significant majority of Californians favor such legislation.32
That majority has been shaped, in part, by organizations that
have pursued legalization efforts for decades.353 Like federal
345. See A.B. 1529, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal.), Analysis of Senate Committee on
Criminal Procedure, June 13, 1995, at 1.
346. See id.
347. See Greg Lucas, Assembly Approves Marijuana as a Medicine But it Remains
Illegal Under Federal Law, S.F. CHRON., May 19, 1995, at A21. Opponents were quite
outspoken; for example, Assemblyman Tom Woods (R-Shasta) asserted that, "This is
just an open-door policy to get marijuana on the street. This would only send the
message to young people that it's fine to smoke marijuana to feel better." Id.
348. See A.B. 1529, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal.), Complete Bill History.
349. Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to the California Assembly
(May 3, 1996).
350. Id.
351. For example, while marijuana provides relief for some medical conditions, it
may also pose risks for some patients. Thus, while proponents argue that marijuana is
appropriate for patients suffering from glaucoma, it may also cause optic nerve dam-
age and bronchial problems. See Cowley, supra note 187, at 22; see also Eric Bailey,
Politics, Science Clash on Marijuana as Medicine: Drugs: As State Debates Prop. 215,
Some Say US. Stymies Test to Prove Pot's Value. Critics Say Research is Flawed, L.A.
TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1996, at Al (noting that marijuana has been linked to bacterial pneu-
monia among HIV patients).
352. See supra notes 31, 239.
353. The best example of such an organization is NORML, which has been in-
volved in state and federal attempts at marijuana legalization on both the judicial and
legislative fronts since the 1970s. See supra notes 274-98 and accompanying text.
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officials, Wilson did not offer a compromise solution to the
problem. That proved to be a mistake."
III. HOW CAN WE REFORM THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
Proposition 215 demonstrates both the best and worst as-
pects of the initiative process. Its poor drafting and the
misleading campaign carried out by its supporters demon-
strate some of the glaring weaknesses of the initiative
process. 5 Even with flaws in the initiative process, in the case
of Proposition 215 it worked as intended. Despite wide public
support for the legislation, the normal legislative channels
failed, leaving the initiative process as the only available
route. 5s Insofar as it put power back in the hands of the vot-
ers, whose aims were frustrated by unresponsive elected
officials, Proposition 215 demonstrates the virtue of a device
that reinjects the popular voice into the political process.
As this Article has argued, that voice comes at a consider-
able cost. After reviewing some current reform proposals, this
section considers how the initiative process might be reformed
to keep its strengths intact while remedying its weaknesses.57
354. The public would have been better served by AB 1529, even as written, than
by Proposition 215. For example, AB 1529 did not include some of Proposition 215's
open-ended language, like the § 11362.5 (b)(1)(A) allowance for "any other illness,"
which promises to produce confusion and unnecessary litigation. Had legislators been
willing to engage in compromise with Governor Wilson, some of AB 1529's defects
might have been avoided as well. See supra notes 115-17, 123-26 and accompanying
text.
355. See supra Part I.
356. See supra Part II and infra notes 357-91.
357. This section discusses the weaknesses in the initiative process demonstrated
by passage of Proposition 215. It does not delve into all of the problems with the sys-
tem. For example, it does not address problems created by the initiative cottage
industry that has generated income for itself by proposing new initiatives.
This problem is best illustrated by the 1984 initiative that created California's state
lottery system. The lottery initiative was the brain-child of Kelly Kimball, head of a
Los Angeles-based signature-gathering firm. In 1984, Kimball convinced a Georgia-
based lottery equipment company to contribute more than two million dollars to back
his lottery campaign. See Dan Bernstein, Lottery Initiative Was One Consultant's Roll
of the Dice, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 5, 1996, at Al. Once the initiative passed, the
Georgia company was awarded a forty-million-dollar contract to print game tickets
and to provide other services for the state. See id. That example demonstrates the
incentive to create a demand for reform where none existed. This kind of initiative
hardly seems consistent with the original goal of the process.
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A. Some Recent Proposals
In 1979, 83% of Californians polled said that they found the
initiative process to be a good thing.5s Based on recent legisla-
tion aimed at reforming the process and on anecdotal evidence,
it is doubtful that the initiative process would receive such
overwhelming support today. As one member of the Assembly
observed, the initiative process "needs to be cleaned up to re-
flect the realities and complexities of the 1990s."
359
A number of reform proposals have emerged during the past
decade. The most thorough reform proposals were drafted by a
commission created by the legislature in 1991. Assembly Con-
current Resolution 13 created the Citizens' Commission on
Ballot Initiatives, consisting of the Attorney General, the Sec-
retary of State, the president of the County Clerks'
Association, and 12 members from the public and business
sectors, the general public, and the academic community.8 0
The legislature appointed the commission to address public
concerns about aspects of the initiative process.3 ' Among those
concerns were overuse of the process, the employment of in-
creasingly complex measures designed to confuse the voters,
and domination of the process by special interest groups.
3 6 2
The commission's proposals should be the starting point for
discussion of initiative process reforms. Unlike some current
proposals, the commission's report did not play to the passions
of the moment.3 A number of specific proposed reforms are
worth careful review.
358. See Jon Matthews, Initiative Process Loses Some Luster, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Sept. 13, 1990, at A4.
359. William Endicott, The Initiative: Our Third Rail, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 22,
1997, at A3 (quoting California Assemblywoman Debra Bowen).
360. See A.C. Res. 13, 1991-1992 Reg. Sess. (Cal.).
361. See id.
362. See id. In adopting the resolution, the legislature specifically recognized the
following problems: increased number of initiatives (60% of all initiatives in the state's
history were submitted during the 1970s and 80s alone); initiatives based on single
interests rather than broad-based policy; initiative drafting that created financial
benefit for sponsors; the growing "initiative industry"; the complexity of initiative
measures; an overload on the judiciary and an over-amended constitution "alongside a
body of inflexible quasi-constitutional statutory law"; and decreased voter support of
the initiative process itself. See id. ACR 13 also refers to a 1990 election day poll
which showed that 40-50% of those casting ballots had little or no knowledge of sev-
eral of the ballot propositions. See id.
363. Assembly Joint Resolution 26 and its parallel provision in Congress, H.R.
1170, offer a recent example of playing to current political passions. AJR 26 urges the
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Among the most important recommendations were the fol-
lowing. First, the legislature should be required to hold a
timely public hearing on all initiatives qualifying for the bal-
lot."' Second, the legislature should have the opportunity to
develop and enact a similar proposal. This may eliminate the
need for the initiative to appear on ballots at all.3" Third, pro-
ponents of the initiative should have the power to amend the
initiative within seven days of the public hearing as long as
those amendments are consistent with the "purposes and in-
tent" of the initiative."' Fourth, the legislature should have the
power to amend a statutory initiative three years after its pas-
sage, also provided that it is consistent with the initiative's
purposes and intent.6 7 Fifth, related initiatives should have
comparison charts in the ballot literature to allow voters to
compare the measures and to warn them that if conflicting ini-
tiatives are approved, only one becomes effective.3  Sixth, the
pamphlet should state how legislators and the governor voted
on the initiative.6 9 Seventh, the Legislative Analyst's summary
should clearly explain the effect of a "yes" or "no" vote.7 °
Eighth, if proponents challenge the wording of a pamphlet's
summary or caption, judicial review should be immediate and
before the pamphlet is circulated. 371 Finally, there should be
full disclosure of the top five financial contributors to the ini-
tiative process.
372
President and Congress to enact legislation requiring a three judge panel to review
constitutional challenges to state law enacted by a referendum. See A.J. Res. 26, 1997-
1998 Reg. Sess. (Cal.), Legislative Counsel's Digest, May 19, 1997, at 1. H.R. 1170
would enact that requirement into federal law. The proponents are motivated by frustra-
tion over Federal District Judge Thelton Henderson's determination that Proposition 209
violated equal protection. See Paul Hefner, Anti-Affirmative Action Law Is Constitu-
tional, Court Rules, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 9, 1997, at Al.
364. See, e.g., CITIZEN'S COMMISSION ON BALLOT INITIATIVES, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE STATEWIDE INITIATIVE PROCESS 3 (Comm. Print 1994)
[hereinafter CITIZEN'S COMMISSION REPORT] (stating that a public hearing should be
held within ten business days after an initiative qualifies for the ballot).
365. See id.
366. See id.
367. See id. at 4.
368. See id. at 6.
369. See id. at 7.
370. See id. In 1994, this suggestion was codified on a trial basis. See CAL. ELEC.
CODE § 9085 (West 1996). Included in the statute is a sunset provision, repealing the
section on Jan. 1, 1999, unless a later statute extends the date. See id.
371. See CITIZEN'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 364, at 7.
372. See id. at 7. The Citizen's Commission Report included other recommenda-





The Election Code currently provides that the legislature
must hold hearings after an initiative has qualified for the
ballot.373 In some cases, the legislature fails to conduct the re-
quired hearings without repercussions because the Election
Code provides no remedy.374 The Election Code might be re-
formed to give any voter standing to bring an action for a writ
of mandate to compel the legislature to conduct a hearing.
Legislative hearings, despite their notorious excesses, 7
serve a number of important functions. They allow input from
groups affected by the proposed legislation. They help educate
the public about pending legislation. They help explain the in-
tent of the legislature in adopting the legislation. Hearings
may also demonstrate the need for textual changes to avoid
confusion or to address unanticipated legal problems.
The Senate did hold hearings on Proposition 215. 376 The
hearings highlighted numerous problems with the initiative.
3 77
While the hearings may have served a purpose in educating
the media and the public, the legislature had few options once
problems were identified. The hearings did not diffuse support
for Proposition 215. The legislature might have passed its own
version of the initiative. Typically, the legislature lacks incen-
tive to do so, since the initiative supersedes legislation insofar
as the legislation differs from the initiative.3 7' Absent the abil-
ity to amend the initiative or take other effective remedial
action if hearings reveal weaknesses in the initiative, the leg-
islative role is more ceremonial than substantive.
373. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9034.
374. See id.
375. See, e.g., Peter Grier, Campaign Probe Unlikely to Offer Watergate's Grip:
Congress's Investigation Into Campaign-Finance Scandals Begins Tomorrow Amid
Partisan Squabbles and Other Problems, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 7, 1997, at 3
(noting that the Senate had subpoenaed 30 witnesses ranging from President Clin-
ton's closest aide to Hillary Clinton's chief of staff to testify about alleged 1996
campaign fund-raising abuses).
376. See generally Joint Hearings, supra note 67.
377. See supra notes 66-69, 106-07 and accompanying text.
378. Consistent with traditional maxims of statutory construction, a later enact-
ment is controlling when it conflicts with an earlier statutory provision. See, e.g., City
of Petaluma v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 282 P.2d 43, 46 (1955).
SPRING 1998]
768 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
C. Amendments and Similar Legislation
Some of the commission's recommendations would, under
some circumstances, address the problem of poorly drafted
legislation. The commission recommended that the initiative's
proponents be given authority to amend the proposition's lan-
guage as long as it does not alter the original intent of the
initiative. 9 It also proposed that the legislature be empowered
to enact similar legislation, thereby obviating the need for the
initiative.380
Those recommendations go a long way toward solving some
of the basic problems with the initiative process. The hearings
demonstrated Proposition 215's primary weaknesses.8 Had
the initiative drafters been empowered to amend Proposition
215 after the hearings, they might have specified, for example,
that "physician" meant a licensed physician under the laws of
California. 2
That remedy may not go far enough. For example, Proposi-
tion 215 was based on AB 1529, which was passed by both
houses of the legislature a year earlier.3" The governor's veto
forced Peron and his supporters to use the initiative process.3
There is no reason to think that the governor would have
changed his position on medical use of marijuana in the in-
terim."3 Hence, the legislature's ability to avoid the need for
the initiative process is limited.
379. See CITIZEN'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 364, at 3.
380. See id.
381. See generally Joint Hearings, supra note 67. For example, opponents of
Proposition 215 objected to the initiative's loose language at the hearing. Concern was
expressed over the "any other illness" language and the lack of adequate definitions
for the terms "physician" and "primary caregiver." See id. at 40 (statement of Dr. Mi-
chael Meyers).
382. See Joint Hearings, supra note 67, at 63 (statement of Dr. Peter Keegan).
383. See supra notes 33-34.
384. See supra notes 35-37.
385. However, after the passage of Proposition 215, Governor Wilson appeared to
soften his position on the concept of medical marijuana use, stating, "I understand
and share the desire of Californians, a compassionate desire, to ease the suffering of
anyone suffering from a terrible disease ... (But) this law is so badly drafted, so
loosely drafted, that it effectively legalizes the sale of marijuana." Poor, Pitiful Pete,
THE PRESS DEMOCRAT, Nov. 9, 1996, at B6 (noting that Wilson vetoed medical mari-
juana bills prior to the passage of Proposition 215 and stating that Wilson's comments
were indicative of an "[o]ld story in California, where a politician fails to respond to a
public need and then complains because the popular response is imperfect").
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Further, had the proposal to allow post-hearing amendment
been in place, there is no guarantee that Proposition 215 pro-
ponents would have agreed to any proposed amendments.
Proposition 215 departed from AB 1529 in some key ways. For
example, Peron and his co-author added language allowing
marijuana use for "any other illness.""' Proponents of Proposi-
tion 215 might not have been willing to amend that language
because it was intentionally included to expand the scope of
the initiative.3 87 In other words, the language reflects Peron's
view that all use of marijuana is medical and was part of a
conscious strategy to decriminalize marijuana.
In such a case, the legislature might have been unable to
pass similar but more appropriately restricted legislation be-
cause of the governor's and Peron's intransigence. A refine-
ment of the commission's recommendation would allow the
legislature, if unable to secure voluntary amendment by initia-
tive supporters, to place its own version of the initiative on the
ballot as a competing proposal, potentially remedying the
problem. 38 This remedy preserves the power of the people to
circumvent unyielding elected officials but gives professional
drafters an opportunity to write better legislation.
AB 1529 could have been improved, but in contrast to
Proposition 215, it came closer to the voters' intent to legalize
marijuana use for medical purposes. It would have given phy-
sicians and law enforcement officials better guidance on the
scope of the law, reducing unnecessary litigation.3 9
The remedy may also limit the power of special interest
groups. Although special interest groups have ample influence
386. See A.B, 1529, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal.). The Assembly Bill also limited
immunity from prosecution to patients of cancer, glaucoma, AIDS, and multiple scle-
rosis. See id. Additionally, the term "caregiver" was given a stricter definition and the
drug had to be approved for use in writing by a physician. See id.
387. See discussion supra Introduction.
388. Such action by the legislature seems to be constitutionally prohibited. Article
IV § 8(b) of the California Constitution says that the legislature must legislate by
statute. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(b). Additionally, Article II § 8(a) says that it is the
electors who place initiatives on the ballot. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a). The only
reason to doubt unconstitutionality is found in Article VI § 12, which suggests that
the legislature can put a bill before the electorate. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 12. That
provision must be read in conjunction with Article II § 10, which states that the only
way to amend an initiative statute is by submitting it to the voters. See CAL. CONST.
art. II, § 10. Hence, Article VI § 12 must be read by cross-referencing Article II § 10,
and the result remains that the legislature is left with no practical way to offer voters
a competing, well-drafted initiative.
389. See supra Part I.C.1, I.E.1.
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in the legislature,3s legislators who are not beholden to a given
interest group may be able to forge a compromise. As currently
constituted, the initiative process requires no such compro-
mise. Allowing competing initiatives, authored by the
legislature, may undercut some of the power of special interest
groups.
D. Problems Not Addressed: Misleading Ballot Pamphlets
The commission recognized that initiative drafters have of-
ten designed ballot measures to confuse voters.391 The
commission, however, did not address the related concern of
misleading campaign literature or the more difficult problem
posed by misleading advertisements.
Campaign literature is subject to limited judicial review,
39 2
but the standard imposed is difficult for opponents to meet. As
I have argued elsewhere, the campaign literature supporting
the Three Strikes initiative, for example, was extremely mis-
leading.393 Despite that fact, opponents could not meet the
clear and convincing evidence standard required to compel
changes to the literature.39
The commission addressed the problem only indirectly. The
commission recommended requiring the Legislative Analyst to
make a clear statement regarding the effect of a "yes" or "no"
vote,9 ' to provide notice of legislators' votes on the proposed
initiative,39 and to identify the primary financial donors to the
initiative effort.39 This kind of information may help voters
recognize the unstated policies that drive the legislation, but
390. See, e.g., D. HERZBERG & J. UNRUH, ESSAYS ON THE STATE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS 5 (1970) (noting the influence of interest groups on the political process when
individuals fail to participate).
391. See CITIZEN'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 364, at 1.
392. See Brosnahan v. Eu, 641 P.2d 200, 201 (Cal. 1982) ("As we have frequently
observed, it is usually more appropriate to review constitutional and other challenges
to ballot propositions or initiative measures after an election rather than to disrupt
the electoral process by preventing the exercise of the people's franchise, in the ab-
sence of some clear showing of invalidity.").
393. See Vitiello, supra note 5, at 1679.
394. See id.; see also Peter Hecht, '3 Strikes" Fight Rages Inside, Outside Court,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 16, 1994, at B1.





nowhere did the commission suggest methods to correct mis-
statements in campaign literature.
Empirical evidence suggests that campaign literature, as
opposed to advertising, has a limited role in a voter's deci-
sion. 98 Hence, campaign literature reform may be less
important than reforming misleading advertisements. How-
ever, it is counterintuitive to think that ballot literature has no
effect on voters' decisions. I offer two proposals to limit the use
of misleading ballot statements.
The first requires no legislative or voter action. Instead, it
would require courts to develop a maxim of statutory construc-
tion and to follow it consistently. As argued above, if the
courts, in interpreting acts, give weight to statements made by
proponents in the ballot literature, some of the law's feared
excesses will not occur.3" As Professor Kelso has argued, the
California Supreme Court has not formally recognized such a
"Rule of Caution,"4°° and has stated, to the contrary, that initia-
tives should be read liberally. When Kelso examined how the
court behaved, however, he found that despite its pronounce-
ments to the contrary "the court has effectively followed the
Rule of Caution (i.e., rejection of the ballot argument when
expedient, strict construction, and, especially no presumption
of constitutionality)."4 1
Currently, the "new textualism," popular among a number of
judges4' 2 and commentators, urges that the plain text of an act
should usually be definitive. While this argument may have
merit with regard to statutes drafted by the legislature,'4 3 it
does not have merit where the law was enacted through the ini-
tiative process. As argued above, the initiative process invites
careless drafting.'0 ' Also, most voters are unlikely to understand
398. See Kelso, supra note 3, at 358.
399. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
400. See Kelso, supra note 3, at 344-46.
401. Id. at 346-47.
402. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-79 (1993) (relying on
"plain" meaning of the racketeering statute, despite confusion among lower courts in
interpreting the law). For criticism of that decision, see Michael Vitiello, More Noise
From the Tower of Babel: Making "Sense" Out of Reves v. Ernst & Young, 56 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1363, 1380-87 (1995); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REV. 621, 679-84 (1990) (criticizing the Supreme Court's adoption of Justice
Scalia's rigid adherence to plain meaning, the "new textualism," as unpersuasive).
403. See Eskridge, supra note 402, at 666-70 (criticizing extensive reliance on
plain meaning without reference to legislative history).
404. See supra notes 35-37,66-121 and accompanying text.
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the technical statutory language of the proposition."0 5 A voter is
far more likely to understand the narrative that accompanies
the text.
Proposition 215 is a case in point. Earlier, I argued that, by
using traditional maxims of construction, a court might
conclude that "any other illness" includes a wide array of con-
ditions, ones for which a medical doctor would not recommend
marijuana use.4" The language is intentionally open-ended
and confusing because of Peron's belief that all marijuana use
is medical.4 By comparison, the campaign literature promised
that the initiative was intended to provide palliative care to
seriously and terminally ill patients.4  When similarly
misleading claims are also made in advertisements, courts
should construe campaign literature language more liberally
because that literature almost certainly comes closer to the
voters' understanding of what they voted for than does the
statutory language itself.
The second proposed reform would work in conjunction with
a proposal (developed below) to reform misleading advertis-
ing." Currently, the Legislative Analyst has a limited role in
preparing the ballot pamphlet, consisting of a statement con-
cerning the initiative's effect.41 The office appears to be both
non-partisan and expert, but more importantly, it is account-
able to the legislature.41 Voters might be better served by a
commission composed of lawyers and scholars who would re-
view the proposed campaign statements of interested parties,
negotiate changes to reflect accurately the substance of the
405. See Kelso, supra note 3, at 342-43 (noting that as little as 30% of the elector-
ate can actually comprehend the information provided in ballot pamphlets, which
includes the text, a legislative analysis, and arguments both for and against each ini-
tiative).
406. See supra notes 104-11.
407. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
408. See California Secretary of State, supra note 47.
409. See infra notes 412-33 and accompanying text.
410. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9087 (West 1996).
The Legislative Analyst shall prepare an impartial analysis of the measure de-
scribing the measure and including a fiscal analysis of the measure showing the
amount of any increase or decrease in revenue or cost to state or local govern-
ment .... The analysis shall be written in clear and concise terms, so as to be
easily understood by the average voter, and shall avoid the use of technical
terms whenever possible.
Id.
411. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 9143 (West 1992) (providing that the Joint Legislative
Budget Committee has the authority to create a legislative analyst).
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initiative, and prepare an independent analysis of the initia-
tive that would appear prominently in the ballot pamphlet.
E. Problems Not Addressed: Misleading Advertisements
As argued above412 and elsewhere,'13 campaigns in support of
ballot initiatives have been marred by misleading advertising
campaigns. Unlike ballot literature, which is read by a rela-
tively small segment of voters, advertisements are widely
disseminated and almost unquestionably influence elections.'
14
Reforming political advertising, however, is problematic.
Political advertising comes close to the core of the freedoms
protected by the First Amendment."15 There is much debate
about whether the First Amendment protects commercial
speech and whether it is designed to further self realization, 41 6
but there is universal agreement that the core protection of
the First Amendment involves the protection of political de-
bate. Democracy is served by vigorous political debate."7
Efforts directed at limiting advertising would almost cer-
tainly run afoul of the First Amendment. 4" Requiring approval
of the content of advertisements would neither be sound policy
nor a constitutional practice. When confronted with concerns
about false speech, free speech advocates traditionally argue
that more speech is the answer.4"
In an election, false or misleading advertising is presumably
countered by the opponents' true speech. Observers of Califor-
nia's recent ballot initiatives recognize that, after listening to
the cacophony, voters may be left not with truth, but with
412. See supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
413. See generally Vitiello, supra note 5.
414. See Kelso, supra note 3, at 342 (noting that when asked about the importance
of various sources of information on ballot initiatives, voters rank the ballot pamphlet
materials below newspapers and television).
415. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1131-32 (2d ed.
1988) ("Mhe consequences of chilling free expression by attempting to purge speech
of false charges are peculiarly pronounced in the context of political elections, which
are absolutely dependent upon the free exchange of ideas that lies at the core of the
first amendment.").
416. See id. at 890-04 (discussing commercial speech doctrine).
417. See generally Eu v. Democratic Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
418. Such a limitation on political speech would limit core First Amendment
speech. One could not seriously argue that such advertisements come within the
Court's commercial speech cases allowing for greater regulation.
419. See TRIBE, supra note 415, at 785-86 (discussing the "marketplace of ideas"
argument for freedom of expression).
773
774 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [
competing, equally misleading accounts of the proposed legis-
lation. As recognized by critics of competing experts in our
trial system, at the end of the day, the listener may have no
more confidence in where the truth lies than she did before.
Proposition 215 was unusual in that opponents were not
well funded,42 which is surprising given that many crime re-
lated initiative campaigns raised large sums of money.421' A
well-funded opposition might have addressed the real prob-
lems with Proposition 215. While more speech is the
traditional answer to combat misinformation, Proposition
215's opponents were as casual, if not less so, about the initia-
tive's effect as were its proponents.
As discussed earlier, at least some opponents who spoke
during the joint hearings demonstrated a casual regard for the
truth, at best.4' For example, one witness opposing Proposition
215 argued that a foreign physician's recommendation of
marijuana published in an underground newspaper would be
sufficient to give a person reading that recommendation a de-
fense to prosecution.4 23 Another witness suggested that the
initiative would give a youngster the right to grow and to use
marijuana because, "anxiety levels on going to school make
their learning very difficult, and because anxiety is a legiti-
mate medical illness in which a substance like marijuana may
provide relief." 2 ' Other similarly extravagant claims were
made by opponents to Proposition 215.' 25
The initiative process works if the voters understand what
they are adopting. Examining these campaign advertisements
does not give one confidence that the voters understood what
Proposition 215 accomplished.' 26 Restricting political speech is
obviously unconstitutionalff and poor policy, but adding a neu-
tral and scholarly account of the initiative would help voters.
420. See supra note 44.
421. See, e.g., Vitiello, supra note 5, at 1678 (noting that proponents of the "Three
Strikes" initiative engaged in a propaganda campaign of embarrassing proportions).
422. See supra note 69 and infra notes 424-25.
423. See Joint Hearings, supra note 67, at 36.
424. Id. at 40.
425. One opponent, who asserted that Proposition 215's loopholes were inten-
tional, stated, "No medical exam's required. No documentation. You go to a doctor's
office, they have no idea that that's not even their patient. They don't have to say. All
they have to do is orally recommend it." Id. at 54. Later, that same opponent contin-
ued, ". . . this just allows a few pro-marijuana doctors or a few quacks to get up there
and just legalize marijuana by just saying it. You get a radio doctor. That's all it
takes." Id. at 55 (statement of Tom Gorman).
426. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
427. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a).
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For example, a scholarly account might have addressed
whether the initiative was limited to seriously and terminally
ill patients.' It might have addressed whether marijuana ac-
tually provides relief from the illnesses where it might be
recommended.' 29 The analysis might have discussed whether
the initiative was in fact allowing any healer or only licensed
medical practitioners to recommend marijuana. 0 It might
have examined whether marijuana can be recommended for
stress, headaches, and menstrual cramps.'
31
The Legislative Analyst's office is highly regarded. 2 Were
that agency entrusted with the job of drafting a neutral as-
sessment, it might become the target of increasing political
pressure to conform its legislative assessment to that of a par-
ticular interest group or group of legislators. For that reason,
as suggested above, I would urge creation of a commission of
legal scholars whose tenure would not be dependent on the
legislature.43 3 This commission could draft public interest ad-
vertisements that would air along with advertisements funded
by proponents and opponents of an initiative.
Requiring public interest advertisements to be aired along-
side other advertising would almost certainly rid the current
system of its excesses. Proponents and opponents alike would
have an incentive to avoid hyperbole in their advertising be-
cause having false claims exposed by a non-partisan group
would undercut the credibility of the speaker. Such a proce-
dure would confirm our faith that more speech is the answer
to misleading speech.
CONCLUSION
Proposition 215 may have been the only way to circumvent
intransigent elected officials who were unwilling to pass
popular legislation. In that sense, it demonstrates the utility of
the initiative process.
428. See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 109-11.
430. See supra notes 68-73, 78-81, 88 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
432. See California Legislative Analyst's Office, About the Legislative Analyst's Of-
fice (visited October 22, 1997) <httpJ/www.lao.ca.gov/laofacts.html> (noting that the
Legislative Analyst's Office enjoys a national reputation for its ability to provide non-
partisan analyses to the California Legislature on fiscal and policy issues).
433. See supra text accompanying notes 410-12.
SPRING 1998] Proposition 215 775
776 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Beyond that, though, Proposition 215 demonstrates the
flaws of the initiative process. Based on these flaws, this
article has suggested specific reforms to the process. It
identified the foremost problem with the initiative process:
that initiatives are poorly drafted, at times intentionally so.'
Excluding professional drafters and legislators from the
process almost guarantees that result. Further, the initiative
process does not currently require proponents to accommodate
competing interests. Hence, even if legislative hearings
demonstrate inadequate drafting or areas of confusion, the
process does not anticipate amendment or other accommoda-
tion once the initiative has qualified for the ballot.435 Finally,
current advertising practices and campaign literature erode
our confidence that the electorate is properly informed about
its selection when voting on an initiative.436
These problems can be corrected through specific reforms.
Procedural reform might allow amendments to the initiative
by proponents even after the initiative has qualified for the
ballot. In addition, the legislature would be able to place a
competing proposition on the ballot when proponents resist
amendments. 7 Creation of a commission of independent legal
scholars to prepare both a neutral assessment of a ballot ini-
tiative and public service advertising can correct current
practices that frustrate efforts to educate voters about their
choices. 3
For millions of Californians who are tired of partisanship
and who remain distrustful of politicians, reform would be a
welcome relief, allowing us to fulfill the responsibility imposed
by the initiative process.
434. See supra notes 29-30, 355-57 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 365-75 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 365-75 and accompanying text.
438. See supra note 433 and accompanying text.
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